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The National Training Center (NTC) concept is studied
with the goal of evaluating the proposed training system and
the role of instrumentation in the battalion evaluation
process. The current battalion evaluation system and its
data inputs are described. An analysis is conducted on the
evaluation process to determine additional instrumentation
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The fast pace of modern mechanized warfare and the impact
of increasingly complex and lethal weapons systems have
placed growing demands on the U.S. Army training system to
continue to provide well trained individuals, crews, and
combat units to meet the challenging demands of the modern
battlefield. Because of increased training complexity, Army
units have been limited in the amount and quality of training
that can be given to its basic combat elements - the company/
team and the combined arms battalion task force [5], The
increasing emphasis placed on the employment of these unit
echelons in combat has mandated a requirement for an effec-
tive training program. In general , unit training at home
station is limited by:
lack of an appropriately sized training area
restrictions on employment of realistic close air
support, electronic warfare, supporting artillery,
and live fire because of local regulations
lack of realistically equipped aggressor forces in
proper unit strength
insufficient training funds to acquire and maintain
sophisticated training aids and training ammunition
local distractors (post detail, personnel turnover,
ancillary training, exercises, etc.) which tend to
limit the amount of training time and personnel
available for unit training.
The Army's training problems were thoroughly probed by the
Army Training Study Group (ARTS) in 1977-78 [22] . Their
conclusions highlighted the factors previously mentioned
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and suggested remedies to improve collective training.
Recommendations applicable to this paper included:
a need to rapidly apply new training technology to
training problems
to attack the unit training problem by focusing on
training the leaders within the unit
a need for independent verification of unit proficiency.
The findings of the ARTS Group were largely anticipated
in early 1977 when the National Training Center (NTC) con-
cept was first articulated at Headquarters, Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and approved by the Vice Chief of
Staff of the Army [19] . The National Training Center con-
cept was proposed as an aid in solving the training problem
through creation of large training areas in separate geo-
graphic regions where intense, highly supported training
could be undertaken by combined arms battalions. This train-
ing would take the form of instrumented force-on-force
maneuvers and realistic live-fire exercises over a two-week
training period. In addition to the maneuver units, battalion
staffs would come to NTC to take part in wargaming and command
post exercises (CPX) which would polish control procedures
without the expense of moving an entire battalion.
The NTC concept has since been compressed to a single
area, Fort Irwin, California, where mechanized task forces
(tank and mechanized infantry battalions) , their attendant
brigade headquarters and supporting elements , and battalion




....to establish a place where Army units can
undertake essential combined arms training that
cannot be accomplished at home station due to
physical limitations and/or prohibitive total
cost of providing an NTC type environment at all
home stations; and to gather hard data about
battlefield performance and effectiveness of
organizations and systems under realistic simu-
lated conditions. 1
The key objective of the NTC is therefore to raise Army
readiness by providing realistic training and objective
training feedback to the battalions training at Fort Irwin
using a TRAIN-EVALUATION-TRAIN methodology.
This approach to improving Army readiness through
realistic training and objective feedback at the battalion
level has its roots in Army lower echelon training and is
related to similar training received by Air Force and Navy
flight crews. In the 1974-1976 timeframe the Army developed
its REALTRAIN (Realistic Training) concept for use by squads
and platoons [7,20,21]. The REALTRAIN concept used relatively
crude optical devices and close monitoring by controller
personnel in force-on-force mock battles between infantry
and tank platoons. The real time casualty assessment and
immediate training feedback provided was found to increase
unit proficiency sharply, especially when repeated exercises
were used. REALTRAIN' s chief drawbacks were the large numbers
of controller personnel needed and its limited evaluation






apability. Navy flight crews began using similar training
echniques in 1969 and were able to raise their air-to-air
ill ratio in Southeast Asia from 2:5 to 1 in 1965-68 to
2:1 from 1970-73. Following the Navy's example the Air
orce has installed a large instrumented combat training
ange, code named Operation RED FLAG, in the desert near
ellis Air Force Base, Nevada. There, flight crews are trained
gainst opposing forces (OPFOR) employing Soviet-style tac-
ics and equipment and engage in realistic simulated missions -
11 in a closely monitored environment which detects and
ecords every move for later analysis. Post-mission de-
riefings and remedial training are used to ensure that the
rews have learned essential combat skills [24]
.
The Army's National Training Center thus draws from a
roven training concept. However, the NTC concept statement
ocuses on the combined arms battalion and requires objective
valuation at that level, and these requirements add significantly
o the scope of the problem. The RED FLAG and REALTRAIN
raining concepts focus on a few aircraft or an infantry
'latoon. The NTC must track and evaluate a combat battalion
1th 50-70 combat vehicles and 800 men, as well as supporting
artillery, engineers, and close air support. A force-on-
brce training exercise against a realistically sized threat
brce requires the instrumentation of up to 450 players
vehicles and weapons systems) on a battlefield up to 20 x 40
1M. Live-fire exercises require similar instrumentation,
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but employ an automated target system. The training concept
for the battalion task force thus creates a difficult data
collection and reduction problem. The requirement for objec-
tive evaluation of the battalion poses a two-fold problem -
the determination of evaluation measures and the amount and
type of data which is to be collected. Army training evalua-
tions, notably the ARTEP (Army Training Evaluation Program)
have generally been very subjective in nature, due to a lack
of suitable instrumentation. Proven objective evaluation
measures do not exist for a battalion, though development
work in this area has been done. A preliminary CATRADA
study [18] lists hundreds of measures of effectiveness (MOE)
and measures of performance (MOP) applicable to a battalion
task force. The large numbers of performance measures cause
one to focus on the second part of the evaluation problem,
the need to determine how much data is required to evaluate
a battalion. Given the data collection constraints and a
need to quickly reduce performance data for training feed-
back there is clearly a limit on how much data can be col-
lected and used. The problem is to identify these perfor-
mance measures and collection levels which are most important
in the evaluation of battalion performance.
In discussing the background and purpose for the National
Training Center it can be seen that the Army has begun an
ambitious and complex program to increase the readiness of
its combat battalions through the use of realistic training
and objective evaluation. This paper has a twofold goal in
16

dealing with the National Training Center concept. The
accomplishment of these two goals will provide a basic
understanding of the complex issues at NTC and serve to
underscore areas in which additional work must be done.
The first goal is to examine the operating format, the
instrumentation system, and the evaluation concept which
will make the NTC the most sophisticated training area in
the Army training system. This examination focuses on the
field training of maneuver battalions at NTC and the assump-
tions and problems which affect operations and the evaluation
process. The instrumentation system is described in the light
of its capabilities and the data which it can supply for the
evaluation process. The second goal is an analysis of the
current evaluation methodology and the contributions of the
instrumentation in the measurement of unit performance.
Focusing on data collected by instrumentation, the analysis
looks first at ways to increase the amount of data collected
by instrumentation. Then, a different technique is proposed
for structuring the unit performance measures in an effort
to determine their contribution to the analysis of unit per-
formance.
The rapidly evolving nature of the National Training Cen-
ter requires that a caveat be included in this paper. At the
time this paper was written the NTC was undergoing rapid
changes in both its operation and its structure. The list of
references cites numerous drafts and working papers which
17

constitute the only specific information known about many
areas of NTC. The information contained in them is accurate
as of 10 February 198 0. Located at Appendix A is a research
chronology which lists dates and agencies which were used
in the preparation of this paper. It must be anticipated
that future changes in NTC operating policy will alter some




An expanded description of the form and functions of
the NTC is provided by the TRADOC System Description:
....The National Training Center will consist of
an instrumented live fire range, a maneuver area
capable of accommodating opposing armor or mechanized
infantry battalions, a centralized exercise control
and training analysis facility, and field instrumen-
tation to provide location and status/event data for
ground and air systems, to simulate weapons systems
engagements and to assess in real-time simulated
casualties and damage. It will also include range
communications, electromagnetic spectrum management,
field controllers, a voice and video recording system,
and necessary administrative/logistic support. The
National Training Center will replicate as faithfully
as possible the battle conditions expected in NATO
versus Warsaw Pact conflict to include opposing forces'
weapons, tactics, uniforms, and other equipment; elec-
tronic warfare; and battlefield obscuration. It will
emphasize timely on the spot critique and formulation
of a "take home" remedial training package. Finally,
exercise and live fire outcomes will be used to
assess doctrine; tactics, organization, and weapons
system performance.
^
While this statement describes more fully the activities which
will occur at NTC it falls short of supplying the necessary
operating parameters within which unit evaluations must be
conducted. A detailed examination of proposed operating
concepts is a requirement in order to specify a method of
evaluation and identify the factors which affect it.
2 . .National Training Center Phase I Ins trumentation System ,
Statement of Work, Revision 1, p. 4, 26 November 1979.
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\. IMPLEMENTING AND OPERATING SCHEDULES
1. NTC Implementation Schedule
The implementation of the National Training Center
occurs in two phases, the first scheduled for July 1981 [23].
rhe phases are keyed to the amount and sophistication of the
instrumentation employed at NTC. Phase I calls for simpler
off-the-shelf instrumentation hardware, designed to get the
NTC operating at the earliest possible date. Phase II, planned
for FY 85, will feature more sophisticated hardware, designed
specifically with NTC in mind and capitalizing on the experi-
ence gained in Phase I. Phase II instrumentation will be
more accurate and capable of measuring increased numbers of
unit parameters. Prior to Phase I several concept tests will
be conducted to evaluate both instrumentation and NTC operating
concepts. The Phase I initial operating capability (IOC) in
July 1981 calls for a capability of NTC to train 20 combined
arms battalions a year. The battalions will come to NTC for
two weeks, controlled by their parent brigade headquarters.
The number of battalions trained annually will gradually be
increased until full capacity is reached in FY84. At full
capacity 42 battalions will train at NTC each year, a new
pair arriving every two weeks. At full capacity effective
scheduling and adherence to mission timetables will be criti-
cal in order to maximize both the training benefit to the
unit and the utilization of the instrumented training area.
20

2 . Unit Training Schedules
A sample training schedule [23] for a battalion task
force is displayed at Appendix B. The six mission periods
designated in the tactical training period are designed to
move the unit through different mission scenarios and increase
unit proficiency. The training periods are of 36-48 hours
duration and may be used in a single block for a multiple
mission scenario or broken into smaller blocks for repetitive
training at a specific mission, depending on the needs of the
training unit. The evaluation scheme must be flexible enough
to deal with either option and the instrumentation must have
sufficient operating capacity for at least 48 hours of con-
tinuous use. The mission critiques must be structured so as
to fit into the 12-hour break period and yet allow for unit
maintenance and preparation for the next mission.
B. TRAINING REALISM
Field testing and experience with the ARTEP since 1975
have indicated a direct relationship between the realism of
the training environment and unit proficiency [19,20,22].
3Figure 1, illustrates the relationship between unit proficiency
and training realism. Improvements in the realism of the
training environment have been shown to contribute to increases
in unit proficiency, especially when coupled with immediate
training feedback [21] . The NTC seeks to exploit this















interrelationship by providing for the training unit a
realistic battlefield which is as close to the combat
environment as possible. The essential elements [23] in
this environment are
:
1. Opposing Forces (OPFQR)
Realistic opposing forces will be provided to support
training. A Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment with full





Because of the isolated nature of Fort Irwin full
power jammers operating at realistic locations may be used
to duplicate OPFOR electronic warfare practices in all fre-
quency spectra.
3. Close Air Support (CAS)
The NTC will allow employment of close air support
both in the engagement simulation and live fire modes.
Joint planning necessary for air-ground operations can be
accomplished by the agencies responsible for CAS execution.
4. Dirty Battlefield
Battlefield obscuration, NBC, engineer counter-mobility
exercises, and other operations which tend to create confusion
on the battlefield will be available at NTC. Normal battle-
field irritants such as dust, smoke, and fire will also be
simulated at NTC.
5. Live Fire
A large live-fire maneuver and impact area will allow
realistic weapons delivery (within safety margins) and

simultaneous employment of direct and indirect fires. A
dynamic target system will represent the opposing force and
will be provided with instrumentation for after action
analysis.
6. Engagement Simulation
MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems)
will be used on OPFOR and friendly elements to provide





Position location systems, event recorders, voice and
video recorders coupled to an analysis facility will enhance
the ability of evaluation personnel to make accurate, objec-
tive assessments of unit performance. Field controller





Training battalions will be airlifted to Fort Irwin.
They will be required to draw and use POMCUS (Positioning of
Materials Configured to Unit Sets) equipment, using proce-





Units at the NTC will use the TRAIN-EVALUATE-TRAIN
model during operations at Fort Irwin [23] . Evaluations
will be based on objective measures of performance which are
24

closely tied to hard data collected by instrumentation.
Initial After Action Reviews (AAR) will be presented to key
unit leaders not more than two hours after the conclusion of
a training exercise. These AARs will critique unit perfor-
mance, highlight key events, and present evaluation results
through the use of interactive computer graphics, voice and
video recordings, and a synthesis of the other data inputs.
A final AAR will be conducted at the end of a unit's two
week training period and will focus on overall unit strengths
and weaknesses, again supported by objective data. A "take-
home" package of training results will be furnished to the
unit so that home station training may be directed at resolving
weaknesses identified at NTC.
Effective evaluation is an important training tool,
but it must not limit unit training. The evaluation process
must be as transparent to the user as possible, and must not
impose burdens on the unit which will reduce training realism
or unit effectiveness. The complex instrumentation system, as
described in Chapter III, will not be allowed to drive train-
ing, but will be responsive to the needs of the unit being
trained. Operational problems with the instrumentation sys-
tem will not dictate cancellation of an exercise but will
force a manual, more subjective evaluation of unit perfor-
mance by the evaluation team. The tight schedule of units at
NTC will not allow otherwise.
25

2 . The Role of Evaluation at NTC
An issue which is essential to the design of an
evaluation system for NTC deals with the role of unit train-
ing and evaluation and the reasons for assessing unit effec-
4
tiveness at NTC.
Various reasons for assessing unit performance have
been articulared, and these views can be pictur-d as lying
on a scale with two distinct end points. At one end lie those
which point to NTC as a test of unit performance, with evalua-
tion geared in that direction. The evaluation scheme of the
"test" community would be directed more to hard performance
data and measurement of performance against a standard to
determine a performance level. At the opposite end of the
continuum is the view that the training and evaluation at
NTC is only a resource which provides the unit with the capa-
bility to diagnose its weaknesses and apply remedial action.
The "diagnostic" community sees evaluation more as a descrip-
tive process and uses standards only as yardsticks of per-
formance level, not absolute goals to be attained. These
two views, as well as those in between, share a common bond
in that their performance measures are drawn from the same
core of unit data. Information from this core can be drawn
and packaged in different ways to satisfy varying the evaluation
4The ideas expressed in this paragraph were developed
in a conversation with Dr. Duncan Hansen of Science
Applications, Inc.

purpose. A decision, made essentially by the Army command
structure, must place the NTC evaluation policy somewhere
along the evaluation continuum.
3. The NTC As Part Of Army Training
In recent years the Army has attempted to order and
systematize its training efforts in an attempt to raise the
proficiency of all levels of the Army and provide emphasis
in those areas deemed most important to the success of Army
missions. This effort, though far from complete, has resulted
in the implementation of the Skill Qualification Test (SQT)
for individual soldiers and the Army Training and Evaluation
Program (ARTEP) for collective training at the various unit
echelons from squad to battalion. Because of its unique
training opportunities (and also potential drawbacks) the
NTC concept must be integrated into Army training so that it
can complement existing training systems and expand the
training opportunity into areas where gaps now exist.
The NTC, with its large maneuver space, capacity for
realistic training, and objective evaluation system, is a
capstone for training at the battalion level. It must focus
on those activities of a battalion which cannot be exercised
or evaluated at home station. Simply to duplicate the
battalion ARTEP would be a waste of resources. The NTC will
concentrate on the battalion's coordinated application of its
organic and supporting fires to accomplish a desired mission.
Because any evaluation system cannot measure all the activi-
ties occurring in a battalion, the NTC evaluation system must

concentrate on those fundamental operations which measure a
battalion's performance. This limitation means that some
training activities, primarily at the crew/squad and platoon
level, will be lost or disregarded if not essential to the
battalion evaluation. This lost training must be accom-
plished at home station. The resources at the NTC must focus
on the battalion and training which can only be done at NTC.
It is important also to put the NTC in perspective
regarding its effect on the unit training schedules at home
station. Unit training must be geared to send well prepared
units to NTC. However, the NTC mission, or fear of unit
failure at NTC, must not be allowed to drive the allocation of
all training time and resources at a unit's home station. In
recent years a drive toward multi-echelon unit training has
helped eliminate the "peak and valley" effect in unit readi-
ness. As a result, units now spread their training through-
out the training year instead of having brief concentrated
training periods which bring high unit readiness, only to have
combat proficiency slip during long gaps between training
cycles [2]
.
Even at peak operating capacity at NTC, units will
only train at Fort Irwin once every 18 months. Unit comman-
ders will thus normally exercise at NTC only once during their
command tours. To overemphasize individual unit preparation
before NTC could actually weaken overall Army readiness unless
the training cycle and NTC are viewed in proper perspective.
28

D. TACTICAL MISSIONS AT NTC
The purpose of the National Training Center is to support
the training of tank and mechanized infantry units in typi-
cal NATO-Warsaw Pact scenarios. Because of the limitations
imposed by the terrain at Fort Irwin, the portability and
operational characteristics of the instrumentation, and the
configuration of the POMCUS equipment, training will be limited
to tank and mechanized infantry battalions and armored
cavalry squadrons and their supporting units. The capability
to instrument dismounted infantry battalions is not present
at NTC.
Appendix C lists the tactical missions which will be
available for training units at the NTC [23]. These missions
will be practiced by units either in a live fire or instru-
mented force-on-force scenario. Particular missions, mission
sequence, and scenarios will be determined by training units
in conjunction with NTC cadre 30-90 days before deployment
to Fort Irwin. Missions may be practiced singly or grouped
in random order, depending on unit desires and time availa-
bility. The commonality of evaluation measures for particular
unit types across the mission spectrum is a potential problem.
This issue is more fully developed in the evaluation section
of this paper.
E. NTC LOCATION
In July 1979 Fort Irwin, California was selected from a
group of candidates as the site for the National Training
29

Center. A deactivated Army post now used by the California
Army National Guard, Fort Irwin will revert to Army control
in January 1981 [23] . Because of its location, terrain
characteristics and desert environment Fort Irwin offers
advantages as well as challenges to training units and to the
successful implementation of the National Training Center.
These factors directly influence the type of training which
can be conducted, its frequency, and the evaluation used to
critique training.
1. Location
Fort Irwin is located in the high desert of central
California and covers an area of approximately 642,000 acres.
The nearest civilian community is Barstow (population: 18,000),
located 38 miles to the south and connected to Fort Irwin by
a two lane highway. Fort Irwin contains the normal facilities
found on a post of comparable size: post exchange, commissary,
hospital, fire station, military police, etc. It contains
troop barracks and 288 sets of officer and enlisted housing,
not enough to house all of the permanent cadre personnel to
be assigned to operate the NTC [24] . Significant numbers of
cadre personnel and civilian technicians will make the 75-mile
round trip to Barstow daily. Training units will be quartered
tactically in the field and pose no burden on post housing.
A dirt air strip (Bicycle Lake Army Air Field) exists on post,
but it will not handle troop carrier aircraft. Training
units will deploy into George AFB, located 65 miles to the
southeast and be transported to Fort Irwin. Motor pool and
30

maintenance facilities exist, but they have not previously
operated at the level required by the NTC. The nearest
railhead is in Barstow, therefore all shipments to Fort Irwin
must be made by road until FY 1984 when a spur is scheduled
to connect with the railhead in Barstow.
The isolation of Fort Irwin provides a benefit in that
a wide spectrum of training activities can be undertaken with-
out interfering with the local civilian population. EW opera-
tions, low flying aircraft, the use of CS and smoke can be
used with few restrictions. However, the remote location of
the NTC will almost certainly affect maintenance of vehicles
and equipment and will require key personnel to be quartered
on or near Fort Irwin. Shift schedules for evaluation and
operations personnel will be influenced by quarters location
as well as training requirements. Personnel problems asso-
ciated with long term duty at an isolated post can be antici-
pated.
2 . Terrain
The terrain at Fort Irwin is properly described as
high desert (mean elevation is 2300 feet) and is an inter-
esting combination of mountain ranges, broad valleys, and
isolated hill masses [24] . Soil composition is sand and vol-
canic rock which offers good traf f icability in all seasons.
Even the smooth terrain is quite broken with rills and small
gullies which impede vehicle movement but offer limited cover
and concealment for individual soldiers and vehicles. Scrub
vegetation is relatively plentiful, offering some concealment,
31

but it is not dense enough to provide concealment from the
air. Maneuver is limited only by terrain features and
numerous artillery impact areas, which will be cleared prior
to IOC for the NTC. Fort Irwin lacks a good road net within
the major parts of its maneuver area, limiting access pri-
marily to tracked and four-wheel drive vehicles. This limi-
tation, as well as the rough nature of the terrain, will
stress the reliability of on-vehicle instrumentation equip-
ment and limit movement around the maneuver area by controllers
and maintenance crews unless properly mounted.
Figure 2 shows the two primary training areas to be
used at Fort Irwin. Each of these areas will be fully
instrumented for evaluation, including the buffer areas.
The requirement for a single main evaluation center near the
cantonment area places a burden both on the instrumentation
and the evaluation team. Large amounts of performance data
must be efficiently transmitted over large distances (up to
40 km) to the evaluation center for analysis. The requirement
for immediate critique for large numbers of personnel requires
that debrief materials (TV tapes, voice recordings, computer
output) be portable so that they can be used at a field site.
Perhaps the most serious impact of the terrain at Fort
Irwin is its effect on unit training and tactical operations.
Fort Irwin is not typical European terrain. Its topography
Prime Item Development Specification for Position Location/
Event Registration System of the U.S . Army National Training
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figure 2.
Fort Irwin Primary Maneuver Training Areas
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and inter-visibility ranges are quite similar to Europe, but
the absence of the concealment offered by European vegetation,
the lack of a comparable road net and urban buildup, and the
desert soil conditions (providing dust signatures, etc.)
must affect the way in which a unit operates. Performance
measures, if they are styled to be valid in Europe, may not
apply in the desert. Great care must be taken in the evalua-
tion to critique a unit on what it does at Fort Irwin, not
what it should do in Europe. The terrain tradeoff, necessary
to acquire maneuver space and realistic conditions, need not
limit the effectiveness of NTC. Sound tactics and good unit
leadership are fundamentals which apply regardless of terrain
variation.
3 . Environment
The environmental conditions at Fort Irwin, like the
terrain, pose significant problems to the evaluation process.
High desert areas have wide daily temperature variations.
Variations of up to 7 degrees are not uncommon. Adverse
weather conditions are characterized principally by low tem-
peratures and high winds. Weather extremes will affect the
instrumentation used at NTC and rugged design is a require-
ment. A preliminary equipment test in January 1980 was
delayed when 80-knot winds prevented the erection of some
instrumentation towers and weakened supporting wires on others
The ability of the evaluation team to operate and deal with
the environment will be a critical factor in NTC operations.
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The environmental conditions at NTC do not duplicate
those in Europe. Though extremes of weather will exist, the
snow and rain conditions and limited visibility which char-
acterize the European climate, especially in the winter, will
not be present. Evaluations must therefore recognize the
different conditions. As with the terrain variations, units
must be evaluated on performance at the NTC, not using
European conditions which are not found at Fort Irwin.
F. PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
The personnel and equipment allocations at the National
Training Center are designed to provide optimum support and
operational equipment to units training at Fort Irwin. The
allocations are designed under the premise that deploying
units will bring minimum home station equipment with them and
will perform only those duties associated with preparation
for, execution of, or recovery from their training mission.
Only those personnel and equipment factors which relate to
the evaluation process will be discussed here.
1. Personnel
NTC planning anticipates that more than 2500 personnel
will be directly involved with the training unit [23] . Of
these the majority will be members of the OPFOR unit and will
play only a supporting role in unit training and evaluation.
The organizational chart for the NTC operations group is
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displayed in Figure 3. The NTC has a unique structure in
that it combines "trainers", the TRADOC element, with the
"troops", cadre and OPFOR from FORSCOM (Forces Command),
under the overall command of a brigadier general. Since all
training troops are members of FORSCOM units the command of
the post is a FORSCOM responsibility with the mission of pro-
viding a training base for applicable CONUS units. The TRADOC
element is responsible for planning and execution of training
for the visiting units. The integration of the two major
commands at NTC is a factor which will require monitoring
to assess functional effectiveness and to affirm the congru-
ence of the operational goals of each major element.
The operations group, composed of TRADOC personnel,
is responsible for conduct and evaluation of training. The
two key elements within this group are the EMC (exercise
maneuver control) section and the TAF (training analysis and
feedback) section. EMC personnel are responsible for the
operations which control the training scenario and environ-
ment such as control of OPFOR, airspace clearance, and fre-
quency spectrum management. The EMC personnel work primarily
in the data center, which is the heart of the instrumentation
system.
TAF personnel are responsible for training analysis
and the post-exercise training feedback given to the units.
The organization chart is derived from a briefing slide
provided by the NTC TRADOC Systems Manager's Office, Fort






























The TAF is split into two parts: the field controllers and
data center personnel. These key personnel must be thoroughly
trained and highly experienced. Ideally, field controllers
should have command or staff experience at the level at which
they evaluate. Field controllers are responsible for field
maneuver control/ exercise safety, and the evaluation of non-
instrumented unit actions. Each training battalion will have
18 controllers to monitor operations down to platoon level and
in the essential staff areas. Field controllers will supply
key inputs into the unit evaluation by monitoring areas not
covered by instrumentation. Data center personnel do the
remote monitoring of battalion performance from the central
control facility. While command experience is not as criti-
cal at this level (except for a few key observers), rigorous
training and knowledge of the instrumentation is required
if key actions are to be captured by instrumentation for later
critique. Data center personnel and field controllers hold
joint responsibility for effective evaluation, each in his
area of optimum capability.
2 . Equipment
Deploying units to the NTC will draw vehicles and
equipment from stockpiles tailored to a particular unit con-
figuration, designated as POMCUS stock. Four battalion sets
(two armor and two mechanized infantry) will be positioned at
Fort Irwin. Units will draw the equipment on arrival, use it
for training, do necessary repairs and services after train-
ing, and return the equipment to NTC control. The vehicles and
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major weapons systems issued will be configured with nec-
essary instrumentation and replacement of faulty player sets
will be a continuing requirement. This task will be a cadre
responsibility as maintenance personnel from the training
units will not have the necessary repair training. High
vehicle mileage and hard use will necessitate vehicle rebuild
at an accelerated rate over the Army standard and maintenance
costs will be high due to the frequency of vehicle use and
the rough terrain in the maneuver area.
Instrumentation equipment and player packs are more
fully discussed in the next section of this paper. Because
of high use factors, rough handling, and their complex nature
the availability of player packs will be critical. Evaluation
personnel must be aware of instrumentation status and the
effects of instrumentation breakdown. Players who cannot be
"killed" because of instrumentation failure must not be
allowed to skew the training evaluation unnecessarily.
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III. NTC PHASE I INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The NTC Phase I Instrumentation System, when operating
with all its subcomponents, completely controls the training
environment in which visiting units will operate at the National
Training Center. The components of the system are shown in
Figure 4, along with a description of their essential func-
7tions. These components, when interfaced with one another,
control the scenario, the operating environment, and the
evaluation of the training battalion during the six mission
periods of the training cycle.
For the purpose of instrumented evaluation, five of the
subsystems (each marked with an asterisk in Figure 4) are
essential to the collection and processing of raw instrumented
data. The term "instrumented data" is taken to include all
those data elements which are automatically collected without
operator interface or which require an operator only to begin
or end the collection process. This data is then used in the
unit evaluation, either by automatic processing into various
statistics or through interpretation by TAF personnel in the
data center. A complete unit evaluation requires that raw
data be collected and processed from three primary sources:
7National Training Center System Specification , Revision
1, p. 20, 26 Nov 1979.
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instrumentation, field controller inputs, and voice trans-
mission interpretation. The latter two sources have key
roles in the evaluation process, but data collection from
them is essentially a manual task of a subjective nature,
affected by biases at the player and collector level. Instru-
mented data is objective, readily collected, and can provide
insights into other data requirements. In this section, the
characteristics of the essential instrumentation subsystems
will be examined, as well as the objective data elements which
they provide. This analysis is a preparatory step which leads
to a discussion of the evaluation system and how the data
elements can be incorporated into the evaluation.
B. INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM SUBCOMPONENTS
The five subcomponents of the Phase I Instrumentation
System identified in Figure 4 control the collection and
evaluation of instrumented data. As such, the function and
capability of each subsystem must be examined. No attempt
is made to provide detailed technical specifications, as
these will be driven by operating requirements. Instead,
operating needs and equipment capabilities will be discussed
as they affect the instrumented data gathering process. As
the Phase I technology is off-the-shelf, equipment limitations
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1. Position Location Event Recording System
a. System Description
The position location/event recording subsystem
(PL/ERS) is one of the two chief components of what is
informally termed the "on-vehicle player pack" [28]. When
combined with a direct fire simulator (MILES) or an inter-
face to the vehicle weapons system (part of the Live Fire
System) , the PL/ERS provides a complete record of the location
and firing activities of a combat vehicle and its associated
weapons during the training exercise.
The position location function of PL/ERS is designed
to keep an accurate location (within 20 meters) of every com-
bat vehicle and major weapons system within the battalion
[8,11,19]. Vehicles for which PL will be kept include all
tanks, APCs, and command post carriers of both friendly and
OPFOR forces. Major weapons systems such as TOW which are
capable of being dismounted from a combat vehicle are also
tracked, as are selected personnel when they are dismounted
from their vehicle. Tactical aircraft, including both Army
helicopters and Air Force close air support (CAS) aircraft,
are also monitored. The position location of each is updated
at a rate proportional to the vehicle's rate of movement.
Ground systems have an update rate of every 4-10 seconds,
while tactical aircraft positions are updated at 0.1-0.5
second intervals [19]
.
The event recording system (ERS) complements the
operation of the position location system. The ERS is coupled
43

both to the PLS and to the engagement system (LFS or MILES)
and serves to keep a record of the key firing events of the
vehicle and the hits recorded on it. Every time a vehicle
fires one of its weapons, the time of firing and weapon type
is recorded and sent to the central data bank. If a vehicle
receives a hit from an opposing system, the time of hit,
type of weapon, and effect on the vehicle (near-miss or kill)
is recorded. Event data is recorded at the time of occurrence
and is then correlated with the location information provided
by the PLS. One of the features of ERS is that it will pos-
sess the capability to record and transmit up to eight events
from systems which are interfaced with it. The draft system
specifications [28] list three events which will be trans-
mitted via ERS. These are discussed more fully in Appendix
I.
The exact form of the PL/ERS is uncertain and
largely a function of competing technologies [8] . Regardless
of its final form, the system must have two major parts:
the on-vehicle pack and a telemetry system which controls
the extraction of information from the vehicle pack and its
relay to the data center. The player pack has as subassemblies
[19]:
the PLS system,
the ERS and an interface to the engagement system
of MILES or the live fire system,
an event clock accurate to .01 seconds,




The telemetry system interfaces with both the player pack and
the data center and must be able to poll the vehicle player
packs for position location at the proper time as well as
be able to relay even data as it occurs.
b. Operating Constraints
The technology limitations described below are
inherent to PL/ERS and will limit the amount of data col-
lected in some areas.
(1) Accuracy . The 20-meter position accuracy
will limit the usefulness of PL data at the individual vehicle
level. The potential for use of PL data in line of sight
modelling, indirect fire assessment and individual vehicle
tactical movement is limited.
(2) Player limitations . The size and cost of
player packs limits their use to major weapons systems
(tanks, APCs, TOW, etc.,), and specified dismounted personnel.
The exact number and type of player u nits to be purchased
is listed in Appendix D. The planned number of 500 systems
does not permit instrumentation of recovery vehicles, supply
trucks, and other support vehicles with functions outside the
"shooting" war. Instrumented evaluation in these areas will
be limited. This limitation also affects dismounted elements,
where keeping PL/ERS on dismounted squads and platoons will
be difficult.
(3) Limited data input . The capability of
recording only eight events limits the amount of information
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which can be centrally stored. The only weapons, designated
"major weapons systems," for which firing data is maintained
are tank main gun, TOW, Sagger, and Maverick missiles. Input
data constraints will not permit PL and time records to be
kept on other weapons. Hit/kill data is maintained for all
weapons with a PL/ERS player unit, but not for non-instrumented
vehicles or personnel.
2 . Multiple Integrated Laser Engagment System (MILES)
a. System Description
The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
(MILES) simulates the fire of direct fire weapons systems
and is used in the engagement simulation (force-on-force)
exercises at the National Training Center. Basically, MILES
consists of a receiver-transmitter combination which uses
eye-safe Gallium Arsenide lasers to simulate the fire of
direct fire weapons systems [9]. The MILES transmitter is a
coded beam laser transmitter which is attached to the weapon
whose fire it is simulating. There exists within MILES a
complete weapons hierarchy, from the M16 to the TOW missile,
facilitated by the beam coding. By coding the beam, being
able to measure its intensity, and using logic circuits in
the receiver, MILES is able to enforce proper engagement
techniques for particular weapons systems and to provide
realistic operating ranges and hit/kill probabilities.
Typical operating ranges are listed in Appendix E [9J . The
MILES transmitter is sound-activated, sending its coded beam
only when a blank from the weapon is actually fired, thus
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forcing logistical play and requiring weapons to be opera-
tional. MILES can be adapted to fire without blanks if
necessary. In the "silent fire" mode, the transmitter employs
a logic circuit which counts the number of rounds expended
and enforces a mandatory "reload" time for larger systems,
such as the TOW and .Dragon. Sample stored basic load sizes
are displayed in Appendix E. When the basic load has been
expended the transmitter is disabled, preventing crews from
having unrealistic amounts of ammunition on board the vehicle.
Once resupply is completed, a controller re-activates the
transmitter and the weapon may rejoin the fight.
The MILES receiver operates in conjunction with
a group of laser detectors which are attached at prominent
places on the soldier or vehicle using the MILES equipment
[9] . When coded laser message pulses are received from a
transmitter (the vehicle is paired with another vehicle
firing its MILES transmitter) , the received codes are analyzed
by the receiver. The arriving pulses are compared to a thres-
hold level. If the pulse exceeds the threshold, the weapon
is in range, and a single bit is registered in the detection
logic. Once a proper arrangement of bits exists (called a
word) , corresponding to a valid code for a particular weapon,
a decision is made to determine "hit" or "near miss". Since
MILES uses a single laser to transmit both the "hit" and
"near miss" beams, it would be more realistic to have a
larger beam size, and thus higher probability, for the near
miss beam. This is accomplished in two ways. First, the
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transmitter emits a smaller number of "hit" words than "near
miss" words, giving a lower probability of hit than near
miss. Second, the transmitter is operated at higher power
when emitting near miss words, thus effectively increasing
beam size.
If a "hit" is detected the receiver determines
by the coding of the beam if the firing weapon can kill the
vehicle carrying the receiver. Once a "hit" has been
determined a simple Monte Carlo technique is used to determine
vehicle damage. Uniform random numbers drawn by the receiver
logic circuits are compared to pre-selected kill probabili-
ties stored in memory circuits. If the random number exceeds
the kill probability a near miss is scored, if not, a vehicle
kill is recorded. The receiver will then cause audio and
visual signals to be sent tothe crew to announce the hit or
near miss. External indications of a kill are signalled by
a flashing strobe light or ignition of a smoke grenade. In
the event of a kill, the transmitter of the killed weapon is
disabled and further participation in the exercise prevented.
MILES equipment will be procured by the National
Training Center in the quantities listed in Appendix F [23]
.
Most soldiers and vehicles in the training battalion will
wear a detector set (receiver) , and thus will be capable of
becoming a casualty. However, only major combat vehicles,
weapons systems, and specified personnel will have an inter-
face from MILES to the PL/ERS. Lighter weapons, such as
LAW, M16, and the .50 cal machinegun, will use MILES in a
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"stand alone" mode, unconnected to PL/ERS . Vehicle or per-
sonnel casualties caused by these weapons will be reported
to the instrumentation system only if they have the PL/ERS
interface.
b. Operating Constraints
MILES represents a giant step forward from the
REALTRAIN/Scopes training system. The engagement/casualty
assessment system offers training realism previously unavail-
able to Army units. As with any system, it is not perfect
and requires compromise and simplification in several areas,
which are discussed below.
(1) Killer-victim pairing . Because the informa-
tion sent in the coded laser beam does not include vehicle
number, the identification of a killer vehicle must be made
by comparing clock data among vehicles or weapons of a particu-
lar type. In a heavy engagement some information may be lost
due to high event rates. Additionally, the lack of PL/ERS
instrumentation on lighter weapons such as Dragon and LAW,
results in the loss of killer information (position, range,
etc.) for these weapons. There is also significant infor-
mation loss in the event of non-pairing by a firing weapons
system. If a tank fires and no pairing is accomplished, no
other information is available. Important information about
direction of fire, target identity, possible false detections,
or suppression of suspected enemy locations cannot be collected,
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(2) Personnel Casualties . Assessing casualties
to personnel is not a problem to MILES, but an effective sys-
tem to do it is needed. When a vehicle is hit, a crewman
becomes a casualty only if illuminated by the killer's laser
beam. The infantry squad in a buttoned-up APC killed by a
tank may exit the vehicle to fight in the battle after the
vehicle is killed, when in reality all or some would be
casualties. At present, the controller must make a subjec-
tive decision about personnel losses and then use his con-
troller's gun to cause a realistic number of battlefield
casualties. Additionally, because they are not linked to
PL/ERS, personnel casualties are not centrally reported.
(3) Kill Probabilities . In order to simplify
MILES single-value kill probabilities (P(Kill)) are used to
determine vehicle status after a hit. The P(Kill) values are
fixed and do not vary to reflect such factors as attack angle,
range, location of hit, multiple hits, etc. Current kill
probabilities are listed in Appendix G for the various weapons
systems which MILES simulates [32]
.
(4) Gunnery Training . MILES is not intended to
be a valid gunnery trainer. While basic engagement techniques
are required, there are differences. For example, no lead is
required when tracking moving targets with a tank gun, and no
superelevation is required for long range targets. Basic
tracking with the TOW is required, but engagement techniques
are somewhat dissimilar from those used to fire actual rounds.
The training value from MILES comes from engagement simulation,
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not the duplication of gunnery techniques. The results
obtained by engaging targets with MILES will not duplicate
the results in a live-fire exercise.
3. Live Fire System (LFS)
a. System Description
The Live Fire System (LFS) is designed to perform
two essential functions in Mission Period 6, the live fire
phase of unit training at NTC [29] . The first function is
the control and presentation of realistic target arrays for
engagement by the maneuvering forces. The second function
is the recording of event data and the transmission of the
data to the data center for evaluation. In order to analyze
how the LFS performs these functions it is necessary to break
the system into two parts: the target system or "down range"
component, and the range system, or "baseline" component.
The downrange target system is composed of
remote-controlled individual vehicle and personnel targets
and fire effects cueing devices which are used to simulate
the presence of an enemy force on the battlefield. The remote
controlled fire effects cueing devices, such as smoke genera-
tors and flash devices, are intended to enhance the realism
of the exercise as seen by the participants. The key elements
of the downrange system are the Swedish-designed SAAB remote
controlled target systems. These systems are radio-controlled
full size vehicle silhouettes which can be commanded to pop
up from concealed positions to present targets to the maneuvering
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unit. Each target is equipped with a visual gunfire simu-
lator and a kill indicator which activates when the target
is hit. The SAAB target has both ballistic and laser sensors
and is vulnerable to both projectile weapons and to MILES
laser simulators for weapons such as TOW and Dragon. Each
target has an automatic scoring mechanism which has a sensi-
tivity control to permit selection of a minimum kill threshold
for ballistic weapons. For example, a .50 cal M2 Machinegun
will not kill a tank, but it may kill a truck. Truck targets,
therefore, can be regulated so that .50 calibre weapons and
above can destroy them. Each SAAB target contains a receiver-
transmitter (R-T) for communications with the baseline range
operating system. Over this R-T, commands will be received
to elevate the target and/or fire the gunfire simulator, and
the R-T will transmit hit data back to the baseline.
The target arrays will be set up in the live fire
area (see Figure 2) at Fort Irwin. Because the SAAB systems
are portable, different configurations may be used to portray
different OPFOR units, tactics, and missions. A system test,
conducted at Fort Hood, Texas in January 19 79 to validate the
training concept, serves as an example of a defensive scenario
[31]. In the test a reinforced motorized rifle battalion
(MRB) was portrayed as attacking a tank-heavy company team.
19 5 SAAB tank targets and 60 dismounted infantry targets were
used to portray the MRB. The targets were arrayed in seven
belts which were placed at ranges from 4000 meters inward to
380 meters from the company position. In the seven belts the
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enemy units were depicted as moving from a march column
formation to an assault of the company position. The targets
were exposed in a manner consistent with the attack speed of
an OPFOR unit, the bulk of engagements being closer than 3000
meters. OPFOR casualties were assessed in real time as fewer
targets were presented in succeeding belts, according to
gunnery results. This exercise illustrates, on a small scale,
how the target area may be designed to portray a typical
mission situation.
The control of the downrange target system, the
collection of target data, and the relay of this data is
accomplished by the range control system, as illustrated in
Figure 5 [29] . A mini-computer is the heart of the system.
The mini-computer executes a stored program to display tar-
gets in a particular sequence. The program relays target
commands to the transmitter console (target control unit)
which controls the target array. The program is revised in
real time to adjust the arrays for targets which have been
killed and reported over the VHF net. The mini-computer
also stores the time-sequenced target data and relays it to
the central data center for integration with other evalua-
tion data.
The Live Fire System constitutes only one-half of
a live fire exercise. It portrays the stimulus event to the
training unit and records the results of the unit's action,
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through a weapons system interface (WSI) to the PL/ERS . For
TOW and Dragon, the weapons system interface is MILES, since
the use of actual missiles would be prohibitively expensive.
For ballistic weapons, such as the tank, an interface box is
connected between the fire control system of the vehicle and
the PL/ERS. The interface is keyed by the firing of the
vehicle weapons and reports weapon type fired and ammunition
used. Like the MILES-PL/ERS link, only firing and position
data for the major weapons systems (tank gun and TOW) will
be time-sequenced and reported to the data center. At the
data center both the time-sequenced firing data and target
data are correlated and a coherent picture of mission results
appears. Pertinent evaluation can then be conducted on the
data.
b. Operating Constraints
(1) Killer-Victim Pairing . The most apparent
problem in the LFS is the correlation of killer-victim data.
The SAAB system can not report the type of the killing weapon,
nor its identity. Likewise, the weapons system interface
box does not indicate the intended target. Because of the
delay caused by projectile time of flight, improper matching
of the killer with the target will distort the data somewhat.
As with the MILES subsystem, weapons with no PL/ERS capability
may kill targets, but no record appears in the data stream.
(2) Employment of Artillery . The employment
of live artillery in the downrange target area is an issue
which affects the live fire system. In the live fire concept
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evaluation [31] the use of 155 mm artillery resulted in
target kills from shrapnel and concussion effects which would
not have disabled actual vehicles. Additionally, the close
impact of high explosive rounds caused unacceptable damage
to exposed target mechanisms. Shielded target mechanisms
suffered no damage, but the 600-pound shielding prevented
normal maintenance on the target and eliminated the man-
portability of the targets.
The solution to the problem perhaps lies
in the use of white phosphorous (WP) or base-ejecting smoke
rounds in the target area, since these rounds have negligible
explosive effect. The use of an artillery simulation (dis-
cussed in the section on the CIS) similar to that proposed
for engagement simulation has the disadvantage of requiring
a downrange fire marker to locate spotting rounds. This would
entail an unacceptable safety risk to control personnel. For
the purpose of this paper, it is assumed that WP or smoke
rounds will be used in the target area, and their burst pattern
is simulated by a computer program which assesses vehicle
damage in the downrange area.
(3) Assessing Friendly Casualties . The TCATA
live fire concept evaluation did not assess casualties to
the friendly unit. This practice undoubtedly affected engage-
ment results to the advantage of the maneuver unit, since a
uniform amount of firepower was available throughout the live
fire problem. A decision regarding the training benefit of
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this approach must be made prior to IOC for Fort Irwin,
rhe issue must balance the tradeoff between lost training
for killed elements against the added stress and the need for
flexibility which is placed on the unit commander in a casualty
situation. This paper assumes that no friendly casualties
are assessed during the live fire phase of training.
4. Core Instrumentation System (CIS)
a. System Description
The Core Instrumentation System (CIS)
,
previously
sited as the "data center", is the heart of the system which
controls both exercise scenario and battalion evaluation,
rhe CIS is physically located near the cantonment area at
Fort Irwin. Its functions are to control the maneuver train-
ing, serve as a central data reception/processing station,
perform indirect fire casualty assessment, and be the central
agency for training analysis and feedback [27]
.
The CIS is literally the center of the instrumen-
tation system. It interfaces with or controls all of the other
Phase I subsystems. The exercise maneuver control (EMC) and
rraining Analysis and Feedback (TAF) sections, discussed pre-
viously, are collocated with the CIS and are the main operators
Df the CIS. The equipment utilized in the CIS includes four
nini-computers, disc and tape drives, and other related equip-
ment. The EMC and TAF sections are hooked into the CIS via
a group of interactive terminals and the sections have the
capability to input and manipulate the data stored in the
computer. The CIS is also directly linked to PL/ERS and
receives and processes its position and event data.
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The CIS offers two distinct advantages which aid
battalion evaluation. First, its use of interactive computer
colorgraphics allows the EMC and TAF sections to "see" all
or selected parts of the maneuver unit as well as the OPFOR
as they perform their assigned missions. The storage of
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) digitized terrain in the CIS
and the input of unit graphic control measures allows prominent
terrain and the proposed unit scheme of maneuver to be dis-
played to TAF personnel. A broad, overall picture which com-
plements the observations of the field controllers emerges,
and a maneuver record is preserved for later review and
critique by the training unit. The second advantage offered
by CIS is speedy central data management. Millions of data
elements are processed into various statistics which can be
manipulated by TAF personnel to give a clear view of unit
performance
.
An important subsidiary function of CIS is the
assessment of indirect fire casualties. The use of supporting
artillery and mortars by the combined arms task force is a
key ingredient in the battlefield success of the battalion.
Since actual rounds can't be fired during force-on-force
exercises, a simulation is developed which will portray the
effects of artillery and mortars. Firing data is received
by the CIS from the DS artillery supporting the battalion.
Since battery positions are known, a projectile flight path
and ground burst pattern can be simulated by the computer.
By checking the updated vehicle position location, casualties
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can be assessed against vehicles in the bursting radius
according to known P(Kill) for artillery weapons. This
information is then relayed by CIS via PL/ERS to the player
vehicles
.
Indirect fire casualty assessment is a valid con-
cept which is technologically difficult to execute. The
difficulty lies not in the work done by CIS, but in realis-
tically portraying the role of the forward observer in the
target acquisition and adjustment process. Adjusting rounds
must be placed on actual grid locations so that corrections
may be made, and range/location errors must be allowed to
occur. Additionally the portrayal of artillery effects to
the player units is difficult.
b. Operating Constraints
Operating constraints for the CIS are very
much hardware driven. Since the exact hardware specifications
are not known, operating constraints are difficult to assess
precisely. The layout of the EMC/TAF, the functional flow of
information, and responsibility of individual personnel must
be carefully designed to handle the large amounts of input
data and the ensuing evaluation requirements. The TAF sec-
tion will work 3-5 minutes behind actual maneuver time in
order to allow processing time for the computer. Since their




5. Voice and Video Recording System (VRS)
a. System Description
The Voice and Video Recording System (VRS) has
the function of recording significant events which occur
during the training exercise [25,26]. These events include
key radio transmissions, TOC operating procedures, tactical
assessments as portrayed on battle maps, and sample tactical
maneuver events. These events are recorded and then analyzed
and input into the data bank to be used in the evaluation of
the battalion. VRS will monitor all tactical nets (command
and fire support) , as well as specified administrative nets
on which the battalion operates.
Since this paper deals primarily with data supplied
by instrumentation and manipulated by the CIS, the voice
recording system will not be extensively analyzed. VRS pro-
vides an essential recording service which allows evaluators
to replay to the unit the message traffic which occurred in
an action and to gather data about the situation as it was
perceived at the unit level. In the analysis of the evalua-
tion system it will be assumed that the TAF personnel have
access to the information contained in the messages which are
passed over unit radio nets. This hypothesis bypasses the
message processing issue and assumes that radio traffic can
be broken down and efficiently disseminated to TAF personnel.
b. Operating Constraints
As with the CIS, the functional breakdown of
responsibilities within VRS will be a key element. There are
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over fifteen tactical nets in a battalion, making the moni-
toring, collection, and cueing functions complex activities.
The flow of information must be complete and yet controlled
so that the evaluation personnel can respond accurately
and quickly to the actual field situation. Unit jargon,
non-standard radio procedures, and the effects of communi-
cations jamming are factors which will reduce the effective-
ness of VRS, since unit radio transmissions must be manually
screened for criticality and entered into the computer data
banks by VRS personnel
.
C. INPUTS TO THE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
The workings of any evaluation system dictate that there
be a conversion of raw input data, regardless of type,
into performance measures according to the specific nature
of the evaluation system. Before a meaningful evaluation
system can be designed the source of each element of raw
data must be examined and classified. In this section the
various elements of the maneuver battalion and the OPFOR unit
are analyzed and matched with the subsystems of the instrumen-
tation system. In this way the data input elements from each
vehicle and weapons system are defined so that a specific
evaluation system may be designed to use all available infor-
mation.
1. Distribution of Instrumented Equipment
The distribution of instrumented equipment to the
player and control elements at NTC is listed in Appendix H.
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This appendix pinpoints the location of instrumented equip-
ment within the battalion and its supporting elements, and
that possessed by the OPFOR unit. Since the exact support
slice to accompany each battalion varies depending on the
unit, generalized supporting elements are described. Stan-
dardized tables of organization and equipment (TOE) are used
to locate the various vehicles and weapons systems within
each organization [6,13]. The equipment in each unit is
described according to the level of instrumentation it pos-
sesses. Instrumentation levels are:
PL - possesses position location
equipment,
ERS - possesses ERS and MILES detector
set, has no MILES transmitter
connected to ERS,
MILES/ERS - possesses complete MILES equipment
and is interfaced with PL/ERS
subsystem,
MILES - possesses complete MILES, but with
no PL/ERS interface,
WSI/ERS - live fire weapons system interface
from vehicle weapons system to
PL/ERS, and
CIS - possesses capability to input to CIS
indirect fire information for
casualty assessment.
The equipment is listed in Appendix H according to the "pure"
form of the battalion. At the NTC battalions will operate as
task forces, exchanging one line company for either a tank or
mechanized infantry company to capitalize on the advantages of
combined arms. The capabilities and locations of the equipment
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should be noted, and an equipment recap provides aggregated
numbers for the battalions when configured as task forces.
2. Instrumented Data Input
Appendix I lists the individual elements of instru-
mented data which are supplied to the CIS during engagement
simulation (force-on-force) and live fire exercises. These
data elements are products of the interactions between PLS/
ERS, MILES, LFS,and the CIS. No refinement or manipulation
of the raw data is attempted, since this is the function of
the evaluation system. The intent of Appendix I is to show
the form of the raw data at its input level, so that the steps
necessary to transform the data from its input state to final
form can be better understood. In reviewing Appendix I one
must remember that time is expressed in intervals accurate
to 0.01 seconds and that locations are accurate to ±20 meters




At the National Training Center units will train using
the TRAIN-EVALUATION-TRAIN methodology [18,2 3] in which unit
performance is critiqued after a training exercise, and then
remedial training will be applied to correct deficiencies.
The evaluation process is a critical part of the training
methodology. It provides a gauge of unit performance and an
indicator of areas which need remedial work. One of the goals
of NTC is to provide an objective evaluation as a means of
improving unit performance. In the light of the previous
discussion on the role of evaluation (Section II, Part B,
Paragraph 2) it is assumed that the evaluation process at NTC
tends toward the "diagnostic" portion of the evaluation con-
tinuum and has as a primary goal the improvement of unit
performance rather than a test of unit proficiency [23,24,25].
In this section the current methodology for developing unit
performance measures is described, along with a discussion of
assumptions implicit in the development process.
A. CURRENT EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
Current evaluation methodology emphasizes the battalion
task force as the focus of the evaluation. The evaluation
methodology uses a top-down approach which takes broad tac-
tical mission statements and decomposes them into progressively
lower functional subdivisions until quantitative measures of
performance (MOP) can be applied directly [18,23]. Figure 6
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MISSION: A clear statement of the
overall purpose for the operation of
a system /
TASKS: Objectives which must be acc-
omplished to satisfy the mission
EEAs : Subcategories of tasks which
lend themselves to analysis
f-
MOEs : Quantitative indicators of the
ability of a military force to acc-
omplish an assigned task or mission
/
MOPs : Quantitative measures of the
ability of a sub-unit to accomplish
a particular task
DATA: Inputs that provide descriptive







shows the hierarchy of analysis and defines the various sub-
divisions. A simple example to illustrate how the process
works is illustrated in Figure 7. The analysis technique is
derived from Army operational test and evaluation methodology
[12] and is similar to that used to develop the tasks, condi-
tions, and standards which are used in Army ARTEP ' s . The
only difference in the two analyses is the availability of
instrumentation at NTC. The instrumentation package at NTC
allows for development of more detailed and objective per-
formance measures for evaluation of the battalion task force.
The bulk of the evaluation analysis has been conducted by
the U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Developments Activity
(CATRADA) in conjunction with the service schools. Their
input has been collated and appears as Reference 18. CATRADA
has identified 8 EEA's,69 MOE's / and 1829 MOP* s in their analysis,
The analysis considers all inputs to the evaluation process,
and addresses instrumented data, VRS analysis, and field con-
troller (manual) inputs across a non-specified mission spectrum,
B. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE EVALUATION METHODOLGOY
An examination of the evaluation methodology must begin
with a discussion of the theory of combat. Combat, when viewed
from a systems standpoint, relates a series of combat outcomes
to a group of inputs through the interaction of a number of
g
combat processes. As illustrated in Figure 8, the inputs to
combat can be thought of as independent variables which are
gThe discussion on the nature of combat was influenced
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acted upon by combat processes to produce various outcomes.
These combat outcomes are interrelated and must be combined to
produce a measure of unit effectiveness or, alternately, a
level of mission accomplishment. This process is neither
simple nor completely understood. In analyzing the nature of
combat there is a tendency to attempt to relate combat out-
comes directly to the system inputs, because the two are more
readily quantifiable. There is, of course, a relationship
between the two, but this relationship is governed by the
various combat processes.
The top-down analysis for NTC, with its EEA/MOE/MOP
methodology, has produced measures of performance which
relate to all three parts of the combat system - inputs,
processes, and outcomes. The eight essential elements of










nuclear biological and chemical.
These EEA are inherently broad and allow measures of per-
formance to be developed and catalogued from all three parts
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of the system without having to identify them as inputs,
processes, or outcomes. If one were interested only in
measuring unit effectiveness it would be necessary only to
combine the relevant combat outcomes into a measure of force
effectiveness. However, since NTC is a training ground, the
factors which contributed to a particular combat outcome are
important. Hence, investigating the inputs and combat pro-
cesses is also important at NTC because they supply informa-
tion about why an outcome occurred.
Adding to the analysis problem is the complexity of the
unit being evaluated. Within each of the combat processes
(attrition, movement, etc.) taking place as a battalion exe-
cutes a particular mission, there are a number of different
types of activity which are simultaneously occurring. Some
of these are [23]
:
Execution - move, shoot,
Control - lead, direct,
Coordinate - synchronize,
Support - maintain, supply,
Plan - anticipate, react, develop.
These sub-levels are contained in all the combat processes,
as well as in the inputs and outcomes of the system. All of
these sub-levels which are relevant to battalion performance
must be examined. An added dimension requires that the rele-
vant processes be examined for the various echelons (platoon,
company, and battalion) within the unit. The output of this
multi-dimensional analysis is the MOE/MOP which describe the
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parts of the combat system. Once developed, these MOE/MOP
are then interrelated. When applied to a battalion exercise
they provide a true picture of mission results, unit perfor-
mance, and the reasons for that performance.
The NTC goal of objective evaluation imposes an additional
burden on the performance analyst. Objective MOE/MOP must
effectively measure performance, quantitatively if possible.
Unit evaluators must then be able to collect data on these
performance measures during training. Of the 1829 measures
of performance listed by CATRADA [18] over sixty percent
require manual collection by either the VRS operator or the
field controller. The collection of this much data and its
efficient evaluation for an after action review poses an
information problem which must be solved. Conversion of
some of these measures to collection by fully instrumented
sources for subsequent processing by the CIS would reduce
the overload. Additionally, the large numbers of performance
measures result somewhat from the limitations of the instru-
mentation used in Phase I. An analysis of the Phase I
instrumentation and suggestions for expansion of its cover-
age is the subject of the first part of the next section.
The complexity of the evaluation problem and the capabili-
ties of the instrumentation have forced CATRADA to adopt cer-
tain limiting assumptions in order to simplify the analysis.




Early in their analysis effort CATRADA identified
many MOE/MOP as being common to a number of tactical missions.
Therefore, a "shotgun" approach was used to develop MOP
without relating them directly to a specific mission to be
performed at NTC. The technique was also designed to reduce
the problem of software design for the CIS as common MOP
could be used across the mission spectrum.
2. Non-Specific Essential Elements of Analysis
The previous discussion of the theory of combat made
a distinction between inputs, combat processes, and combat
outcomes in the combat system. Theoretically, each of these
areas would be sub-divided into different categories and
have different EEA. The CATRADA analysis used eight EEA
to describe the various categories in the three system areas.
MOE/MOP were then forced into the eight categories without
being identified as being inputs, outputs, or combat processes
This simplifies the collation process but complicates the
process of separating MOE/MOP into the "input-process-output"
categories necessary for later analysis.
3. Commonality of Performance Measures
Because of the similarity in unit equipment and mis-
sion scenarios it was assumed that performance measures would
be common across differing unit types. The tank-heavy task
force and mech-heavy task force have similar equipment and
theoretically similar tactical philosophies [2,4], so iden-
tical performance measures were developed to evaluate both
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types of units. Common performance measures are also used
to evaluate both live fire and engagement simulation exer-
cises at the NTC. An examination of Appendix I reveals that
the instrumented data elements are very similar in both
types of training scenario. This similarity was broadened
to include the assumption that neither tactical behavior nor
unit evaluation would be changed by the presence of live




V. ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS
The discussion of the methodology used in the development
of the evaluation system for the National Training Center
completed the first goal of the paper - an examination of the
operation principles, instrumentation system, and unit evalua-
tion process proposed for the NTC. The second goal, an analy-
sis of the instrumentation and evaluation systems, will be
accomplished in two parts. The first part looks at the
instrumentation system and its output and suggests improve-
ments which attempt to obtain more data from the instrumen-
tation and thus lessen the burden of manual evaluation. In
the second part, an alternate method is suggested for develop-
ing evaluation measures. An analysis is used which re-packages
existing MOE/MOP in an attempt to evaluate their effectiveness
and suggests a way to expand the evaluation process to improve
its method of assessing the battalion and its supporting ele-
ments .
A. THE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
In examining the contributions of the Phase I instrumen-
tation system to the evaluation process it is convenient to
separate the analysis into two sections. The first examines
the distribution of the instrumentation hardware and empha-
sizes how the placing of equipment affects the evaluation
which can be performed on the unit. The second section examines
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the actual data elements which are collected by the field
hardware and how these inputs may be modified to improve
evaluation.
1. Location of Instrumentation Hardware
Appendix H details the distribution of instrumented
systems in both BLUEFOR and OPFOR units. As expected, posi-
tion location equipment is concentrated on fighting vehicles
and in command and control elements. These elements are most
important in combat and are the focus of most of the evalua-
tion effort. The mounted combat elements (tanks and APCs)
and attendant major weapons systems (main gun and TOW) are
adequately instrumented in that position location and event
data (of some form) can be extracted from them. The short-
fall in instrumentation hardware occurs with the support ele-
ments, infantry squads, and Dragon crews. At present there
is no PL/ERS on any of the battalion support elements, whether
they are maintenance, mess, or supply assets. These vehicles
will use MILES detector sets only. In exercises of more than
12 hours duration or those which cover extended distances,
the performance of battalion support elements is an important
factor in battalion success. This is especially true in exer-
cises which feature heavy contact where ammunition expendi-
ture, fuel consumption, and vehicle losses are high. Instru-
mentation which can monitor the position and activity of
support and maintenance elements can aid evaluation, especially
since only one controller is dedicated to the evaluation of
support assets [23] .
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The lack of instrumentation is also apparent with the
infantry squads and the Dragon crews of the infantry and
scout platoons. When infantry squads are dismounted and away
from their carriers, which contain the PL/ERS equipment, they
are traceable only through field controllers. Dismounted
activities, such as squad patrols, raids, and the manning of
OP/LPs can not be automatically traced. In the same way,
the actions of the infantry and scout platoon Dragon crews
are lost to data collection. The Dragon, whether mounted or
dismounted, is not tracked by PL/ERS. The Dragon can make a
contribution to the battle in that it has a stand alone MILES
capability and can kill out to its effective range of 1000
meters. The Dragon deficiency is best understood in the con-
text of its role in the infantry company. Aside from two
TOWs and the short range VIPER/LAW systems, Dragon is the only
tank killer employed by the infantry company. In an active
or strongpoint defense, where the squad and its Dragon might
be positioned away from its carrier, little data can be
collected on these elements. The CIS will receive a message
from a vehicle which is killed by a Dragon, but it cannot
pair this information with a firing weapon. Firing location
and crew identity are thus lost.
The solution to the need for instrumentation in the
support elements and the infantry squads is obviously the
procurement of additional PL/ERS equipment. However, its
costs must be measured not only in terms of additional field
equipment, but in the impact on the CIS of additional data
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processing and performance evaluation. With this factor in
mind the following modifications are suggested:
a. Instrumenting with PL/ERS the chief battlefield
support vehicles. These would include: M88 VTRs of the
tank battalion, M578 Recovery Vehicles in the infantry
battalion, and selected fuel tankers and ammunition trucks
of the battalion support platoon. By instrumenting only the
major support vehicles the CIS can track the flow of support
action without instrumenting every support vehicle. Because
these vehicles do not need continuous monitoring a polling
rate of once every 15-30 seconds is sufficient. The ERS
would initially report only if the vehicle were killed, but
additional information could be reported if unused message
statements from the ERS (discussed in Part 2 of this section]
were utilized. The additional messages from ERS would allow
reporting of vehicle cargo status, time of fuel pumping for
tankers, and vehicle status. The additional support data
supplied to CIS would require a dedicated support evaluator^
and a software package to assist him in his evaluation.
b. Re-Allocation of Manpack PL/ERS Equipment.
Appendix D lists 110 manpacks as planned for
NTC. These are chiefly required for dismounted commanders,
video crews, and control personnel. The manpacks of PL/ERS




1 per infantry squad vehicle 36
(One per squad/Dragon, one
per platoon HQs)
1 per Scout platoon Dragon team 8
1 per battalion command element 2
1 per maneuver company headquarters
(mech inf and CS companies only)
1 per GSR team 8
Controllers 27
OPFOR, special purpose 10
Spares 11
TOTAL 110
A re-allocation in this manner has a number of benefits.
Most importantly, it puts Dragon systems into the ERS stream.
Its data inputs would be identical to those for TOW, permitting
better assessment of the use of Dragon. The re-allocation
permits better tracking of dismounted combat. Since personnel
casualties are not logged, some of the manpacks would need
only PL capability. These would include the manpacks for
controllers and command elements. Slower polling rates for
position location are also feasible depending on predicted
movement rates. The need for a manpack for the ground sur-
veillance radar sections is justified by the fact that when
in operation, GSR teams are normally separated from their
vehicle by some distance. PL on the radar sets allows an
evaluation of radar placement and coverage.
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The additional coverage gained by re-allocation
of manpack PL/ERS equipment is gained at the expense of some
of the controller PL. The requirement for controller posi-
tion location is driven by a need for EMC contact with the
controllers in order to assist in orienting them for effec-
tive evaluation. Also, the positioning of artillery fire
markers is aided by an accurate position location. Given
the fact that controllers will become intimately familiar
with the maneuver area and scenario from repeated experience,
this PL requirement may not be valid. However, the fire marker
PL requirement will remain until pyrotechnics and artillery
simulation procedures can be improved to solve the problem
of providing realistic artillery effects.
2. Expansion of Data Collection
In this section the characteristics of the data ele-
ments will be analyzed with a view toward possible changes
in the instrumentation or data elements which would provide
more information to the TAF evaluation team. Appendix I
lists the raw data elements which are collected by Phase I
instrumentation. They are broken into four basic groups:
position location, firing/attrition event recording, special
event recording, and indirect fire casualty assessment. The
first three groups are primarily dependent on PL/ERS, while
the last operates through the CIS.
a. Position Location
In analyzing position location requirements, the
emphasis is placed on determining the elements which need to
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be tracked and required accuracy of location for them. The
first part of this section discussed the distribution of
instrumented equipment and suggested modifications to the
allocation scheme. The modified allocations would allow the
tracking of all major combat systems in detail, while simul-
taneously providing information on the flow of the support
activity. This allows emphasis to be placed on important
combat events without neglecting important support operations.
The accuracy required for position location is
±20 meters [28] . Given the simplified vehicle casualty
assessment routines used in MILES and the display capabili-
ties of present computer colorgraphics, this accuracy is
sufficient for training evaluation. However, development of
sophisticated detection and line-of-sight (LOS) computer models
at NTC could force a requirement for better PL as well as more
sophisticated terrain data. Detection and LOS modules are
important for unit evaluation in that they determine when a
unit should have detected or fired upon an opposing force.
CDEC has conducted validation efforts for a series of inter-
visibility models [14,15,16]. CDEC attempted to match the
results of specific physical detections and line of sight
measurements with the results predicted from three well
known computer models voer varying types of terrain. Their
experiment showed generally poor correlation between the two.
The disappointing results obtained in the validation effort
indicate that methods other than simulation might yield better
results in the detection problem. This question requires
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further study and as yet places no demand for increased
accuracy of position location at NTC.
b. Direct Fire/Attrition Event Recording
The largest numbers of data elements supplied by
instrumentation concern vehicle firing and attrition events.
In engagement simulation this data is derived from MILES and
sent via the ERS to the CIS for processing. In live fire,
attrition data is reported by the range control system to
the CIS while firing data is supplied either by the weapons
system interface (WSI) to the ERS for projectile weapons or
by MILES/ERS for the TOW. This analysis will distinguish
between firing and attrition data and first analyze each
type separately and then examine the interaction of the com-
bined data elements.
The firing data supplied to the CIS by either
MILES/ERS or WSI/ERS considers only what can be termed "major
weapons systems." These include the main gun for tanks, the
TOW for APCs and attack helicopters, the Sagger for BMPs, and
the Maverick missile for CAS aircraft. The argument for
including Dragon as a major weapon system with PL/ERS capa-
bility has already been discussed. The selection of these
weapons accounts for most of the vehicle killing capability
within BLUEFOR and OPFOR forces with several important excep-
tions. Aside from Dragon, the exceptions consist of secondary
armament on the TOW/Cobra (a 20mm cannon) , the BMP (a 7 3mm
gun) , the A-10 (a 30mm cannon) , and conceptually the XM2
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Infantry Fighting Vehicle (a 25mm cannon) . These weapons
are all capable of killing at least APC-type vehicles at
extended range but are not given ERS interface on a cost and
use basis. Instrumenting these weapons would increase the
cost for player units and the CIS processing load. Also,
theoretically, the primary weapons would be most often used
against other instrumented vehicles, and monitoring them is
most important. This argument is somewhat tenuous and will
require additional examination, especially in the case of
the IFV, where the exact employment doctrine for 25mm Bush-
master cannon has not been published. Adding a second weapon
to the event recording is technologically feasible, requiring
only a modification of the MILES and the use of additional
event messages.
ERS does not monitor weapons of .50 caliber and
below. The abundance of these weapons on the battlefield
makes the task prohibitively costly in terms of both money
and computing time.
The firing data supplied to the CIS for live fire
exercises closely parallels that supplied in ES. The WSI/
ERS does not have the capability to report the main gun
ammunition type used by a tank, so standardized use of one type
of main gun ammunition is necessary if the CIS is to use pro-
jectile time-of-flight to correlate gun-target data. HEAT-
TPT, because of its smaller range safety fan, is probably
the best choice. As with MILES/ERS, secondary and small
caliber weapon firing is not reported to the CIS.
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On the target half of the gun-target combination,
MILES/ERS is also responsible for assessment of vehicle
casualties and their reporting to the CIS. MILES is the
primary system for assessing vehicle attrition. When its
receiver detects a hit by a weapon which can kill the target
vehicle, a Monte Carlo process determines if the hit caused
a kill. A vehicle kill is sent to the CIS through the ERS
.
If either the weapon was not lethal enough to kill the vehicle
or the Monte Carlo process did not produce a kill, a near miss
is registered and sent to the CIS. The weakness of this system
lies in the fact that the MILES is not a range dependent
system and the attrition process uses only a single number
for kill probability. Thus, many factors which affect the
actual kill probability, such as range and angle of penetra-
tion, are not portrayed. These simplifying measures will
distort the loss rates somewhat. From a cost/effectiveness
standpoint, this system is acceptable for NTC. The MILES
system used at NTC is only a modification of the equipment
that will be used all over the Army in a stand alone (no
PL/ERS) mode. The economies of scale which result from Army-
wide procurement and commonality of MILES equipment offer a
powerful argument to balance against possible benefits deriving
from development of a different engagement simulation system.
The attrition process utilized in live fire sce-
narios is controlled by the range control system (RCS) . As
illustrated in the lower half of Figure 5, the RCS consists of
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a mini-computer and a target control unit (transmitter)
.
The RCS is alerted when a target is hit or killed and relays
this information to the CIS. A probability of kill as such
is not played by the RCS on a round-by-round basis. The
SAAB targets downrange can be preset for a kill threshold and
for the number of hits required to produce a kill. In this
way different kill probabilities can be selected for various
targets. The live fire attrition system yields less data on
vehicles casualties than is available through engagement
simulation. Because only a kill threshold is used, the type
of weapon which actually killed the target is unknown. Addi-
tionally, data may be affected because the SAAB targets can
register hits when subject to wind gusts or artillery fire.
The CIS operates on both firing and target (attri-
tion) data based on its time of occurrence. This is the only
way actual pairing of firer and target can be accomplished.
This system has a potential problem in that closely spaced
firings by multiple weapons of the same type may be difficult
to differentiate. The problem has an added dimension in live
fire in that projectile time-of-flight must be considered in
the time correlation. The use of lasers coded with vehicle
identification numbers would solve the problem in ES and would
also reduce the dependence on accurate time keeping. A
solution to the live fire problem is more difficult in that
target selection processes must be identified and the weapon
type detected by a killed target.
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More serious than the pairing problem is the data
deficiency which results when a vehicle firing does not achieve
a target pairing through time correlation. In this case no
data is available on the target of the firing vehicle. This
situation can occur for a number of reasons: poor gunnery
techniques, false detections, target malfunction, use of
direct fire suppression, etc. In any event the ERS will not
report any information other than vehicle firing time and
weapon type. Perhaps the simplest solution to the problem
is the use of a device which measures the azimuth of the
main gun at firing and reports this data through ERS. An
azimuth device, if accurate to approximately ±3 degrees (50
mils) , would give clues to the evaluators as to the reason
for non-paired firings. The shortcoming of this solution is
that most of the azimuth data would need manual interpreta-
tion at the CIS, increasing the evaluation workload. Other
definitive solutions, such as the use of a gun camera, would
be expensive and require the same manual interpretation.
c. Special Event Recording
The capability of ERS to input to the CIS a total
of eight different messages offers a potential for the use
of ERS to transmit data other than firing/attrition to the
CIS. At present ERS uses three of the eight possible messages
[28], These messages are: firing, hit/near miss, and trans-
mission with the vehicle radio. The other five message slots
are available for the transmission of data. One obvious
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candidate message is the turret azimuth at firing previously
discussed. Other messages might come from combat vehicle
crews or from support elements, such a s
:
(1) Vehicle status (operational or non-operational)
used by all vehicles to indicate breakdowns, thrown tracks,
etc.
(2) Cargo status (0-100 percent) - used to
trace battalion support activity for ammunition trucks and
fuel tankers or fuel status on individual vehicles.
(3) Tow status (yes or no) - used to indicate
when a VTR is moving a vehicle casualty.
(4) Pumping status (yes or no) - used to determine
re-fueling time for fuel tankers.
(5) Overwatch status (yes or no) - keeps track
of the use of overwatch tactics by maneuver units.
(6) Detection message (vehicle detected) -
coupled with an azimuth reading, this message could be used
to signal a crew detection in a given direction.
Two considerations which affect the use of
ERS to record special events are the equipment capabilities
and the need for the input of data by training units . In
order to minimize the burden on training crews and preserve
the quality of the data, there must be a minimum of outside
requirements placed on the crews, a fail-safe input scheme,
and little opportunity to foil and system by entering false
information. Ideally then, all inputs should be automatically
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made without crew interaction. This requirement impacts
on equipment design. Input or interface boxes connecting
the vehicle systems to ERS must be inconspicuous and relia-
ble, and efficient use must be made of the message capabili-
ties of ERS.
d. Indirect Fire Casualty Assessment
The indirect fire data inputs listed in Appendix
I are elements of conceptual system for indirect fire assess-
ment at NTC. The actual firing unit inputs to the CIS may
be somewhat different, but they will convey the same infor-
mation - unit firing data which must be transformed to grid
locations for round impact and subsequent casualty assessment.
The assessment technique is technologically feasible, as
proved by the use of IFCAS (Indirect Fire Casualty Assessment
System) developed by CDEC, and can provide statistically
acceptable casualty assessment for unit evaluation. The pre-
sent indirect fire data elements and battery information pro-
vide an adequate stream of information on which to base unit
evaluation. The biggest problem to the EMC personnel in the
CIS will be the playing of artillery fire in real time. The
use of real time assessment and realistic firing mission pro-
cedures will enhance both realism and the evaluation of unit
effectiveness. The issue of realistic fire mission procedures
and fire effects is primarily a technical one. Since one of
the battalion's chief support assets is its direct support
artillery, efficient indirect fire evaluation is a key issue.
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Battery operations must be assessed in real time. This
assessment requires efficient simulation of projectile flight
paths based on battery firing data and the ability to put
simulated artillery rounds at proper locations for FO adjust-
ment. This training realism for artillery in engagement
simulation is a problem which has not yet been solved. In
all likelihood a compromise situation will be accepted. In
live fire the realism problem is less difficult. Actual
marking rounds from a firing battery will require FO adjust-
ment. After adjustment the computer simulation will assess
casualties in the fire for effect phase of the artillery
mission.
B. THE EVALUATION SYSTEM
The previous discussion of a conceptual "theory of combat"
provides a convenient basis for an analysis of the role of
instrumented data in the evaluation plan developed for use
at the NTC. The evaluation process, as described in Section
IV, uses a top-down analysis methodology to develop general
measures of performance which describe unit proficiency. The
limiting assumptions, as well as the advantages, of this method
have been noted. It is useful, however, to take the instru-
mented measures of performance developed in Reference 18 and
restructure them into a format which is derived from the con-
ceptual theory of combat, also discussed in Section IV. In
this format the generalized MOP are classified as either com-
bat inputs, processes, or outcomes (IPO) in accordance with
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the systems view of combat. As previously discussed, perform-
ance measures from each of the IPO categories will be needed
for the assessment of combat battalions at NTC, and this
analysis will enable a closer examination of the performance
measures to see if the evaluation spectrum required at NTC
is covered. The ability of instrumentation to cover a large
part of the evaluation process is a key question. If this
is possible, it will release field controllers to cover other
areas in the evaluation and the use of computers will speed
computation of essential performance statistics.
The restructured performance measures are presented in
Appendix J. In the analysis of the present performance
measures, it was decided to change as little as possible from
the structure of Reference 18. Accordingly, all EEA and MOE
were retained in their original form, regardless of applica-
bility. MOP were classified as inputs, processes, or outcomes
and grouped under their respective MOE/MOP . In many cases
MOP were repetitive across various MOE and EEA. When this
occurred the repetitious MOP were not listed, unless the analy-
sis placed subsequent MOP in a different IPO category. The
unit level at which the MOP are evaluated is preserved from
Reference 18. The structuring of MOP into IPO cateogries is
merely one step beyond the approach used in Reference 18.
Admittedly, it does apply a concept which was not used in
the original formulation of MOP. Therefore, many MOP were
placed in an IPO category strictly through the judgment of
the researcher. In some cases a minor change in the wording
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of a performance measure or a different interpretation would
change the category selection. Thus, the IPO analysis is
a subjective process which yields only general conclusions.
Nevertheless, it does provide a basis for examination of the
evaluation process and the role of instrumented data inputs.
Of the 291 performance measures examined, 22 were classi-
fied as combat inputs. The EEA structure proves to be cumber-
some, and a hindrance to effective formulation and classifica-
tion in this case* Reference 10, in its discussion of combat
inputs, classifies the EEA into six basic categories:
mission,
human characteristics and behavior,




The use of EEA similar to those above would make input analy-
sis easier. As done presently, each of the eight EEA would
require subcomponents composed of a few or all of the six
areas listed above. However, the eight original EEA are
effective descriptive elements for the combat processes and
outcomes categories. These two categories contain over 90
percent of the listed MOP.
Slightly more than 20 percent of the instrumented MOP could
be classified as combat processes. This number is again sub-
ject to the interpretation, depending on the particular bias
of the analyst. The eight EEA originally used approximate the
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accepted subprocesses of combat and provide a good start
point for a breakdown into MOE/MOP . However, an examination
of the MOP in the process section reveals that over half of
the MOP (37 of 71) require a yes/no response rather than the
computation of a statistic. This situation is not unusual,
nor is it a real problem. The process category is the "why"
and "how" part of the combat system. In the combat processes
the reasons for an action are determined and the relation-
ships between input and output processes are specified. Of
the three IPO categories, it is the least understood [10].
As a result, quantitative answers will not be forthcoming in
many circumstances. In fact, conversion of these MOP into
quantitative measures generally causes them to be moved into
the combat outcomes category. The process category does not
seem generally suited to the development of instrumented
measures. Perhaps software can be developed to generate
a few of the yes/no answers, and a tabulation can be made
of them, but their applicability and interpretation may not
justify the ffort.
The majority of instrumented performance measures were
classified as describing the outcomes of the combat processes
Seventy percent of the MOP investigated were related to these
outcomes. The reporting of what happened in an exercise can
utilize the speed and accuracy advantages of the computer.
Combat results are generally quantifiable and do not require
interpretation by any intermediate agency. In the combat
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outcomes area lies the real opportunity for employment of
instrumentation. With a few of the modifications and additions
specified in the previous section, areas other than firing/
attrition can supply outcome data, leaving field controllers
and TAF personnel to interpret the combat inputs and processes.
The advantages of the NTC instrumentation system lie in
the combat outcomes part of the IPO process. A few of the
input measures, such as material resources and organization,
may be optimized for evaluation by instrumentation, but the
majority of inputs, as well as combat processes, are best
evaluated by manual means.
The IPO analysis can be used to assist in both the develop-
ment of new performance measures and the evaluation of existing
ones. But more important than the IPO analysis is the evalua-
tion of the usefulness of individual MOP. The MOP which are
developed must be meaningful and collectable by the available
instrumentation hardware. Stevens [12] lists among the
characteristics of good MOE/MOP that they be precisely defined
in terms meaningful both to analyst and user. In addition,
the capability to collect the MOP must exist. To list "How
many times did the platoon seek cover and concealment?" as
an instrumented MOP is unacceptable without defining "cover
and concealment" and specifying how it is to be measured. In
this regard a catalogue of collectable data elements, as in
Appendix I, is a useful tool for determining if a particular
statistic can be generated from instrumented data inputs.
The comment on MOE/MOP development applies equally to VRS
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and manually collected performance measures, as their use-
fulness depends on their definition and the capacity of the
evaluation system to collect them.
9.3

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper served both as an introduction to the problems
and processes at the NTC and as a limited evaluation of the
role and usefulness of instrumentation in the evaluation
process. The National Training Center was shown to be a
complex institution which inserts rotational combat battalions
into a total training environment which features realistic
training and objective performance feedback. The description
of NTC showed it to be a manpower intensive project which
requires the support of over 2 500 personnel to provide train-
ing for a combat battalion of 500-800 men. In addition to
the required manpower, the NTC will require an expenditure
of over $300 million in initial costs and have a yearly budget
of nearly $50 million. The only possible way to justify these
costs is to maximize the learning of training battalions while
at NTC. This learning is, in large part, a function of the
instrumentation system. The NTC instrumentation system was
analyzed to examine the functioning of its parts and its role
in the evaluation process. In the final analysis the instru-
mentation was seen to be an important part of evaluation,
but only one part of the total process. No matter how com-
plex the instrumentation or how many elements it monitors, it
will never be totally satisfactory in evaluating all or even
most of the human processes interacting in training at the
NTC. The chief advantage of instrumentation is its ability
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to rapidly assess the combat outcomes which can be measured.
This step alone marks a significant advance in training
technology because it allows mock combat to be the teacher
and uses actual outcomes as an indicator of a unit's grade.
However, the evaluation system for NTC must identify reasons
for a particular behavior, so that remedial training can be
prescribed. The analysis which evaluates behavior lies
generally outside the purview of instrumentation and it must
usually be judged by observers in a somewhat subjective
manner
.
The NTC system is a complex one, and this paper has
supplied only an introduction to the entire process. Other
significant areas await investigation. These other areas can
best be divided into three functional parts: the other opera-
ting roles of NTC, the NTC evaluation process, and NTC manage-
ment process.
This paper addressed NTC only as it trains the battalion
task force. NTC will conceptually provide training for bri-
gade headquarters and staff elements and will also operate
a command post exercise (CPX) for rotating battalion staffs
which operate in conjunction with field task force training.
The CPX will use CATTS (Combined Arms Tactical Training Simu-
lator) as the exercise agency for the national battalions.
Development work in this area will require much of the same
analysis work as for the battalion evaluation. This involves
an operating concept, mission statements, a proposed command
structure, scheduling considerations, and an interface with
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field battalion training at NTC. Attempts to link CPXs with
field maneuvers have proven extremely difficult to accomplish
in the past. It remains to be seen whether this can be done
at NTC.
The evaluation process, examined in this paper for instru-
mented inputs, has analysis opportunities in a variety of areas
Development of additional MOE/MOP, analysis of VRS and manual
data, and the formulation of a good analysis/collection plan
for all data elements must be done. Additionally, a good
method for presenting training feedback to the maneuver units
must be developed. This method must determine who to debrief,
with what materials, and where and how the debriefing will be
conducted.
The last area of consideration deals with the management
of training assets at Fort Irwin. The NTC is complicated
process with a large budget and significant operating problems.
Optimum rotation of units, effective supply forecasting, and
the optimization of support requirements are routine problems
with which the NTC commander must deal. Because of its isola-
tion and unique training responsibilities, the NTC is a rela-
tively closed system. The NTC began as a bare ground opera-
tion which required most assets to be moved in to begin opera-
tions. When in full operation, it will have very specified
interactions with off post agencies. This situation offers




Within each of the three previously discussed areas
there exist many opportunities for useful and concrete
analysis. The NTC is an evolving system which is still
formulating its operating methods and techniques. The use
of good analysis can prevent costly errors and optimize
operating policies before the institutional roadblocks which













Contact with TRADOC NTC System
Manager (TSM) : COL Edwards
Contact with NTC Office at
CATRADA (Fort Leavenworth)
Outline of possible work efforts
with TSM at Fort Monroe
Liaison and research efforts
conducted with the aid of the
following agencies:
Science Applications, Inc. (SAI)




CDEC (CPT Williams, Mr. Batesole,
Dr. Marke)
U.S. Army Field Artillery School
(CPT Butler)
U.S. Army Research Institute
(Monterey) (Dr. Banks, MAJ
Loftis)
NTC TRADOC Systems Manager Office























CATTS and MILES training
Missions for NTC confirmed
Zero individual weapons
Advanced party departs
Advance party closes Fort
Irwin
Establish receiving party


























Day 9-10 Mission 4
Day 10 After action review
Maintenance/recovery
Receive Mission 5
Day 10-12 Mission 5
Day 12-13 After action review
Maintenance/recovery
Preparation for Mission 6 (Live fire)
Day 13-14 Mission 6 (Live fire exercise)
Day 14 After action review
Final critique
Delivery of take home package
D. Redeployment
+15 days Maintenance
+16 days Unit begins POMCUS turn-in
+17 days Main body redeploys












Conduct passage of lines
Counterattack by fire from a
battle position
Defend a battle position
Defend from a battle area
Overwatch from a battle position
Defend to retain a battle position
Relief operations





Zone, area and route reconnaissance































PL/ERS PLAYER UNITS FOR NTC
























































































































o o O m





C O CN 5j« C
rH £ £ 2
cu < \ en
<T3 VO o in in IS f«




PROGRAMMED MILES EQUIPMENT FOR NTC
Type Number
Man worn detector sets 1664
M16 transmitters 1039
M60 LMG transmitters 134
VIPER/LAW transmitters 134
Dragon MAW transmitters 65
TOW HAW transmitters 4 8
Mil 3 Vehicle set 157
M60A1 tank set 124
M151 jeep set 37
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DISTIRBUTION OF INSTRUMENTED EQUIPMENT
A. Tank Battalion
B. Mechanized Infantry Battalion
C. Support Equipment
D. OPFOR Motorized Rifle Regiment
E. Controller Equipment








event recording system and MILES receiver,
no MILES transmitter connected to ERS
complete MILES system interfaced with
event recording system
complete MILES system in stand alone
operation, no connection to event recording
system
weapon system interface with connection
to event recording system
capability to input indirect fire data
to CIS for IF assessment
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Tank Battalion (TOE 17-35 H)
1. Headquarters and Headquarters
Company




7. 62 mm MG
b. Battalion HQs




M151 1/4-Ton Truck (3)
Manpack (1)








Goer and Goer Wrecker
2. Tank Company (3)
a. M60A1 Tank (17)





































3. Combat Support Company
a. M113A1 (1) (CO vehicle)
.50 cal M2
b. Armored Vehicle Launched
Bridge (2)






2 1/2-Ton Truck (2)
.50 cal MG
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f. Battalion Heavy Mortar Platoon





M151 1/4-Ton Truck (5)
Redeye/Stinger




B. Mechanized Infantry Battalion
(TOE 7-45H)
1. Headquarters and Headquarters Co.
a. Battalion HQs
M151 1/4-Ton Truck (1)
M577 Command Post Carrier (3)




b. Support Platoon, Maintenance
Platoon
M57 8 VTR (2)
.50 cal MG
2 1/2-Ton, 5-Ton Trucks
.50 cal MG
2. Mechanized Infantry Company (3)
a. Headquarters Platoon
Mil 3 Armored Personnel
Carrier (1)
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2 1/2-Ton Trucks (2)
.50 cal MG
Manpack
b. Rifle Platoons (3)
M113 Armored Personnel
Carrier (4)







M125 Mortar Carrier (3)
.50 cal MG







TOW (mounted or dismounted)
x




















































Battalion Heavy Mortar Platoon





M151 1/4-Ton Truck (5)
Redeye/Stinger
Battalion Anti-Tank Platoon




















































2. Air Force Close Air Support
OV-10 Bronco (FAC)




3. Engineer Company (-)
M113 APC (squad Vehicle) (3)
.50 cal MG
4. FA Direct Support Battery
M577 CP Carrier (FDC)
M109 Howitzer
.50 cal MG





M113 APC (Vulcan Gun Carrier)
(8)




























OPFOR Unit (Motorized Rifle Regiment)




Command and Control Vehicles
(6)
b. Recon Company














12.7 mm AA MG
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F. Recapitulation of Instrumented Weapons
NOTE: Organic weapons only. Task force
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a. Number of Vehicles with PL/ERS 74 85 180
b. Major Weapons Systems with 43 37 163
MILES/ERS (tank gun, TOW, Sagger)
c. Major Weapons Systems with MILES only 13 22 96
(Dragon, 73 mm (BMP) , Sagger)
d. Total number of Major Weapons Systems 56 59 259
2. Live Fire
a. Number of Weapons Systems with 37 17
WSI/ERS used for live fire
b. Number of Weapons Systems with 6 20 -
MILES/ERS used for live fire (TOW)
c. Total number of ERS-instrumented 43 37
weapons
d. Number of Weapons Systems with 13 22
MILES only and used for live
fire (Dragon)
e. Total number of major weapons 56 59








1. Vehicle location, updated every
4-10 sees
2. Time Vehicle radio transmitter keyed
3. Time of weapon firing
Type of weapon firing (MWS only)
4. Time of near miss received on vehicle
Type of weapon which fired near
miss at time t
5. Time of vehicle kill
Type of weapon which killed vehicle
at time t
6. Time of weapon firing for indirect
fire
Firing data for IF mission
Type of indirect fire
Number of rounds of indirect fire
7. Location and burst pattern of IF
Vehicles killed by indirect fire
Vehicles receiving near miss by
indirect fire
Time of IF impact
Location of IF unit
8. Digitized terrain data (DMA)





























1. Location of target
Type of target
Kill threshold of target
2. Time target was exposed to
maneuver unit
Time firing cue (flash) was
presented to unit
3. Time target was removed from
unit view
4. Time of target kill
Time of target hit (other than
kill)
Type of weapon which killed
target (ballistic or MILES-
laser)
5. Location of Vehicle, updated
every 4-10 seconds
6. Time of weapon firing (MWS only)
Type of weapon (MWS only)
7. Time of fire for IF
Firing data for IF mission
Type of IF
Number of rounds fired
8. Location and burst pattern of IF
Vehicles killed by IF
Vehicles receiving near miss by IF
Time of IF impact
















firing unit to CIS
firing unit to CIS
firing unit to CIS









RESTRUCTURED MOE/MOP TABLE FOR INSTRUMENTED DATA
The attached table represents MOE/MOP elements from





The original EEA and MOE are preserved, only the MOP are
restructured. In many cases in the table, MOP were dupli-
cated in different MOE. However, each MOP is listed only
where it first occurred, and duplicated only if its category












a. MOE: Force ratio - beginning
MOP: How much equipment is C-P A-l
available by type?
How many HAWS were B-C-P A-l
available?
What percent of OPFOR B C P A-l
forces engaged in the
initial contact?
How many Tanks were C P A-2
located within desig-
nated positions?
How many TOWS were C P A-2
located within desig-
nated positions?
How many vehicles were B C P A-2
available?
How many troops were B C P A-2
available?
Was Dragon position B C P A-2
occupied?
How many weapons/weapon B C P A-3
systems were available?
What combat power was B C P A-
4
available?
b. MOP: Force ratio - end
MOP : none
c. MOP: Number of hits per number
of firings by major weapons
system (mws)
MOP : none








e. MOE: Percentage of enemy
losses inflicted (direct
fire) by mws
MOP: How many targets were P A-ll
in area of responsi-
bility?





g. MOE: Planned vs actual
(distance-time)
engagement
MOP: What was the range of B C A-15
first planned engage-
ments?









j. MOE: Firing time (by mws)
from ID to engage
MOP : none





2. EEA: Fire Support
a. MOE: Response time for
indirect fire require-
ments (call for fire to
fire for effect)









were to the rear?
B A-29
What was the number of
offset registrations?
b. MOE: Number of sorties allo-




c. MOE: Number of sorties flown
vs aircraft lost
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of OPFOR assets
lost by weapons system
(T-64, BMP, people, etc.)
to close air support
MOP : none
MOE: Range at which OPFOR
deployed
MOP: What was the range of
first planned engage-
ment?
B C P A-35
MOE: Percent of Fire Mis-
sions fired
MOP: How much artillery
ammunition was
available?









h. MOE: Number of suppression
missions fired vs num-




a. MOE: Time for OPFOR to break
obstacles
MOP: How many weapons/weapon B C P A- 4
3
systems were available?
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR losses
during breach
MOP: none
c. MOE: Time to breach obstacles
(for US)
MOP: none
d. MOE: Number of Blue losses
during breach
MOP : none




f. MOE: Rate of OPFOR movement
MOP : none
g. MOE: Number/percent of
engineer assets lost
MOP: How many weapons/weapon B C P A-51
systems were available?









i. MOE: Percent of engineer/
equipment hours uti-
lized per number of
availability
MOP: How many vehicles were B C P A-54
available?
How much equipment is B C A- 5
5
available, by type?
j. MOE: Percentage of hit vs




4 . EEA: Air Defense




b. MOE: Number of casualties
due to enemy air
MOP : none
c. MOE: Percent killed by
weapons system
MOP : none




e. MOE: Percentage of engage-
ables that were engaged
per weapons system
MOP : none
f. MOE: Percentage of attackers
who were engageable








5. EEA: Combat Service Support
a. MOE: Number of mws out of
action for maintenance/
number of mws assigned
MOP : none
b. MOE: Number of other major
systems out of action
for maintenance/number
of such systems assigned
MOP: none
c. MOE: Time to repair returned
systems
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems out of action/
number of major systems
returned to action
MOP : none
e. MOE: Number of other major
systems out of action/
number of other systems
returned to action
MOP : none
f. MOE: Number of major systems
where maintenance was
resolved
g. MOE: Number of organization-
ally repairable equip-
ment. Subset: out of
action for maintenance/
number of pieces of such
equipment assigned
MOP: How many weapons are B A-72
functional , by type?








i. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems over time out
of action due to lack
of supply of:
MOP : none
j. MOE: Effectiveness of CSS in




a. MOE: Number of casualties















EEA : Command and Control /
Communications (C J )
a. MOE: Number of messages




b. MOE: Lapsed time of trans-
mission (decision time








c. MOE: Time from information in
to action out
MOP : none








e. MOE: Total top to action and/
or bottom to action time
MOP : none
f. MOE: Time from immediate
request to execution
MOP : none
8 . EEA: Intelligence/Counter
Intelligence
a. MOE: EEFI compromised
MOP: What was the number of B A-150
STANO devices func-
tional?
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR detecta-
ble/number of OPFOR




c. MOE: Number of total OPFOR
accurately described in
terms of location, compo-
sition, and intention/








a. MOE: Force ratio - beginning
MOP: Did the unit receive C P A-2
AT fire?
Did the unit react to C P A-2
AT fire?
Did the unit react to C P A-2
small arms fire?
Did the unit receive C P A-2
small arms fire?
b. MOE: Force ratio - end
MOP: Was organic fire sup- B C P A-3
port used?
Was external fire sup- B C P A-3
port used?
What proportion of B C P A-3
available weapons
employed?
c. MOE: Number of hits per num-
ber of firings by major
weapons system (mws)
MOP: Was a priority of targets B C P A-5
specified?
What was the time C P A-5
exposed until engaged?
What was the time C P A-5
engaged until hit?








d. MOE: Actual detection
(time-distance)
MOP: How much time was re- B C P A-7
quired to detect OPFOR?
How much time is re- C P A-
8
quired to return direct
fire?
Did the unit respond C P A-8
immediately upon enemy
contact?
How many times OPFOR C P A-8
detected vehicles?
Did the OPFOR detect B C P A-9
vehicles?
What was the distance of B C P A-9
friendly force to enemy
force?
Were air attacks B A-9
detected?
e. MOE: Percentage of enemy
losses inflicted (direct
fire) by mws
MOP: Was fire concentrated B C P A-10
primarily on high-
threat targets?
Was an effective rate C P A-10
of fire maintained?
Were tanks, ATGM's B C A- 11
employed in depth?
Did the same weapon hit B C P A-ll











MOP: Did the unit counter- B C P A-13
attack?
Were hostile aircraft C P A-13
engaged?
Did unit maneuver in B C P A-13
response to contact?
g. MOE: Planned vs actual
(distance-time)
engagement
MOP: How long did it take CcP A-15
to move from one posi-
tion to another?




i. MOE: Planned vs actual:
a) unit maneuver (in-
clude CPs, trains)
b) disengagement
MOP: How many times was FPF C P A-16
used to vacate sector?
Was dispersion main- B C P A-20
tained?
How many units were C P A-22
engaged in maneuver?







MOE: Firing time (by mws)
from ID to engage
MOP: How long did it take to B C P A-25
engage OPFOR personnel
while moving?
How long did it take to B C P A-25
engage OPFOR personnel
while stationary?
How long did it take to C P A-25
engage OPFOR vehicles
while moving?
How long did it take to C P A-25
engage OPFOR vehicles
while stationary?
Did fire support the B C P A-25
attack during the
assault?
Are the OPFOR engaged B C P A-25
at the maximum effec-
tive range?
k. MOE: Rate of Blue movement
MOP : none
3. EEA: Fire Support
a. MOE: Response time for indi-
rect fire requirements
(call for fire to fire
for effect)
MOP : none
b. MOE: Number of sorties allo-
cated vs sorties uti-
lized
MOP : none
c. MOE: Number of sorties flown
vs aircraft lost
MOP: Was effect of weather B A-32







d. MOE: Number of OPFOR assets
lost by weapons system
(T-64, BMP, people,
etc) to close air sup-
port
MOP: Were controlled fires B A-33
employed to suppress
or destroy enemy?
Were hostile aircraft B A-33
engaged?
Were surface targets B C P A-33
engaged?
Were OPFOR targets B C A-34
attacked?
How long did btry main- B C A-33
tain firing capability?
e. MOE: Range at which OPFOR
deployed
MOP: Are the OPFOR engaged A- 36
at the maximum effec-
tive range?
f. MOE: Percent of Fire Missions
fired
MOP: Are weapons fired? B C A-38
g. MOE: Response time for indi-
rect fire requirements
MOP: Did the weapons func- B C P A-40
tion?
h. MOE: Number of suppression
missions fired vs number











a. MOE: Time for OPFOR to break
obstacles
MOP : none
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR losses
during breach
MOP : none
c. MOE: Time to breach obsta-
cles (for US)
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of Blue losses
during breach
MOP : none




f. MOE: Rate of OPFOR movement
MOP: Were fires shifted to B C P A-49
OPFOR withdrawal routes?
g. MOE: Number/percent of engi-
neer assets lost
MOP : none




i. MOE: Percent of engineer/
equipment hours utilized
per number of availability
MOP : none
j. MOE: Percentage of hit vs en-









4. EEA; Air Defense




b. MOE: Number of casualties
due to enemy air
MOP: How often was ADA unit B A-59
maneuvering?
How many times were two B A-59
or more surveillance or
target acquisition de-
vices employed?
How many times was radar B A-59
scan rotation direction
and speed changed?
Were weapons fired at B A-60
attacking aircraft?
c. MOE: Percent killed by weapons
system
MOP: How many REDEYE fired B A-61
at each aircraft?
d. MOE: Percentage of hostiles
engaged that were killed
How many weapons fired B A-62
at attacking aircraft?
e. MOE: Percentage of engage-
ables that were engaged
per weapons system
Was one section (two B A- 6
3
Vulcans) positioned
behind the lead company?
Was one section (two B A-63
Vulcans) positioned to







How many REDEYES were B A- 6
3
employed when the target
was within range?
Did ADA unit respond to B A-63
enemy air activity?
f. MOE: Percentage of attackers
who were engageable
Were surface targets B A-65
engaged?
5. EEA: Combat Service Support
a. MOE: Number of MWS out of
action for maintenance/
number of MWS assigned
MOP : none
.
b. MOE: Number of other major
systems out of action
for maintenance/number
of such systems assigned
MOP : none
c. MOE: Time to repair returned
systems
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems out of action/
number of major systems
returned to action
MOP : none
e. MOE: Number of other major
systems out of action/
number of other systems
reutrned to action
MOP : none









g. MOE: Number of organization-
ally repairable equipment
Subset: out of action
for maintenance/number
of pieces of such equip-
ment assigned
MOP : none
h. MOE: Maintenance support
request/answered
MOP : none
i. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems over time out of
action due to lack of
supply of:
MOP : none
j. MOE: Effectiveness of CSS in




a. MOE: Number of casualties from
NBC vs number exposed
MOP : none
b. MOE: Manhours/equipment directed
from primary mission
MOP : none





7. EEA: Command and Control, Communi-
cations
a. MOE: Number of messages attempted







MOP: How long did it take B C P A- 84
to adjust illumination?
How many times were indi- B C P A- 8
5
rect fires called to
suppress vacated sector?
Were support fires ad- B C P A- 85
justed according to
situation as required?
Were support fires B C P A- 85
shifted or lifted
as required?
b. MOE: Lapsed time of trans-
mission (decision time
from receipt of info
until passed on)
MOP : none
c. MOE: Time from information in
to action out
MOP : none








e. MOE: Total top to action and/
or bottom to action time
How many of weapon/sys- B C A-132
terns were able to cover
OP's/Lp's?










a. MOE: EEFI compromised
MOP: How many of supporting B C A-132
fires were covering
OP's? LP's?





Did vehicle positioning C P A-139
permit rapid displace-
ment?
Was battery able to C P A-139
conduct emergency fire
mission (hipshoot)?
How many TF elements B A-14 4
were in overwatch while
maneuver units were
exposed?
Was the type of mission B C A-146
or characteristics of
MIJI determined?
How many radios reloca- B C A-152
ted to avoid detections?
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR detec-
table/number of OPFOR
detected (by time and
location) . (Detected
includes reported)
MOP: Was reported enemy loca- B C P A-157
tion the actual enemy
location?
c. MOE: Number of total OPFOR
accurately described in
terms of location, com-
position, and intention/










a. MOE: Force ratio - beginning
MOP: How much time was re- B C A-2
quired to initiate
maneuver?
How long did it take C P A-2
the unit to react to
small arms fire?
What percent of pieces B C P A-2
engaged in initial
contact?
b. MOE: Force ratio - end
MOP: How many casualties B C P A-3
were taken?
How many casualties per B A-3
air attack?
How many total casual- B C P A-3
ties were assessed?
How many targets were B C P A-3
suppressed?
How much (by type) of B A-4
equipment was affected?
How many friendly vehi- B C P A-4
cles were damaged?
c. MOE: Number of hits per number
of firings by major
weapons system (mws)






How many targets were
suppressed by indirect
fire?













MOP: Were OPFOR positions
located?
B C P A-
7
How many times were B C P A-
OPFOR positions located?
Did the unit detect B C P a-7
the OPFOR?
Was reported enemy loca- B C P A-7
tion the actual loca-
tion?
What was the TF reaction B A-7
time to maneuver and
counter an OPFOR obsta-
cle upon initial contact
by lead elements?
How many OPFOR were B C P A-
8
detected?
How much time was re- C P A-
quired to reach cover?
What was the number of C P A-9
true detections?
What was the friendly/ B C P A-9
enemy detection ratio?




How many targets were B C P A-9
detected?








e. MOE: Percentage of enemy
losses inflicted
(direct fire) by mws
MOP: How many targets des- C P A-6
troyed by suppressive
indirect fire?
What was the range of B C P A-6
the first engagement?
How many targets were B C P A- 10
suppressed by direct
fire?
How many targets were C P A-10
destroyed by direct
fire?
How many rounds to B C A-10
destroy targets by
type of weapon?
How many rounds to hit B C A-10
targets by type of
weapon?
How many rounds to B C A-10
suppress target by
type of weapon?
How many high-threat C P A-ll
targets destroyed?
How many hits occurred C P A-ll
per target?
How many times were C P A-ll
requested fires not
beyond range of direct
fire weapons?
How many hits per B C P A-12
target?












MOP: What number of target C P A-13
hits were achieved by
each weapon, by type?
How many targets hit C P A-13
by direct fire weapons?
How many OPFOR vehicle C P A-13
casualties were there?
How many OPFOR were B C A-13
suppressed?
How many rounds are B C A-13
required to suppress
the OPFOR?
How many rounds are B C P A-13
required to destroy
the OPFOR?
How many rounds are C P A-13
fired per weapon?
Did the unit destroy B C P A-13
OPFOR?
g. MOE: Planned vs actual
(distance-time)
engagement
MOP: How many weapons C P A-15
functioned?
How many high threat B C A-15
targets were destroyed?
What was the average C P A-15








h. MOE: Number of OPFOR des-
troyed (function of
range)
MOP: What is the average B C A-17
range of first detec-
tions?
What was the OPFOR B C A-17
movement rate?
How much time is B C P A-17
required to suppress
the OPFOR?
How much time is B C P A-18
required to destroy
the OPFOR?
How many enemy targets B C P A-18
are destroyed?
Were OPFOR targets C P A-18
destroyed?
How many targets are hit B C P A-18
by type of weapon?
How many targets are B C P A-18
killed by type of
weapon?




MOP: How many targets engaged C P A-16
(or killed) by more than
one weapon system?
What percent engagement B C P A-16
within the effective






How long did each move- B A-19
ment take?
How many OPFOR were B C P A- 20
destroyed while vacating
sector?
How many friendly ele- B C A-20
ments were destroyed
when vacating sector?
How many elements did B C P A-21
not relocate to desig-
nated locations?
At what range did dis- C P A-22
engagement occur?
How much time is re- B C P A-22
quired to relocate a
unit?
What percent of time B C P A-23
did the unit use
travelling overwatch?
j. MOE: Firing time (by mws)
from ID to engage
MOP: How long was the unit B C P A-25
engaged until hit?
How long was the target B C P A-25
engaged until hit?
k. MOE: Rate of Blue movement
MOP: none
2. EEA: Fire Support
a. MOE: Response time for indi-
rect fire requirements
(call for fire to fire
for effect)









Number of sorties allo-
cated vs sorties uti-
lized
MOP : none
c. MOE: Number of sorties flown
vs aircraft lost
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of OPFOR assets
lost by weapons system
(T-64, BMP, people, etc.)




MOP: How many targets en- B A- 33
gaged were outside unit
sector?




How many high-threat B C A-33
targets detected?
How many high-threat B C A-33
targets engaged?
How many detected targets B C A-33
are attacked?
How much of the basic B C P A-33
load was expended?
How many rounds hit the B C P A-33
target (by weapons)?
How many friendly tar- B A-33
gets are destroyed?
What were the no. of B A-33








How many rounds impacted B A- 3
3
in target area?
Were there friendly fire B C P A-33
incidents?
e. MOE: Range at which OPFOR
deployed
MOP: How many high threat B C A-35
targets were destroyed?
How many OPFOR were B C P A-35
destroyed while vacating
sector?
How many times were B A- 3
6
smoke missions fired?
How many times were B C A- 3
requested fires not
beyond range of direct
fire weapons?
How many rounds impacted B C P A- 3
in target area?
How much time is re- B A-36
quired to suppress the
OPFOR?
How many rounds are B A-36
required to suppress
the OPFOR?
How many of the avail- B C P A-36
able targets are
attacked?
How many fires were B A-36
outside of sector?
f. MOE: Percent of Fire Missions
fired







How many smoke missions b A-38
were requested?
What was the immediate b A- 3
8
smoke-mean time (call
for fire to target
screened)
?
How many total rounds B A-3 8
were expended?
How many rounds are B C A-38
fired per weapon?
How many indirect fire B C A-38
missions used smoke to
support movements?
How many FA missions B C A-39
fired?
Were casulaties assessed B C A-38
on targets of oppor-
tunity?
g. MOE: Response time for
indirect fire require-
ments
MOP: How many times was radar B A-40
moved during a mission?
h. MOE: Number of suppression
missions fired vs number
of weapons systems
suppressed
MOP: How many targets are C P A-41
hit by type of weapon?
What number of target C P A-41
hits were achieved by
each weapon, by type?








How many targets des- B C A-41
troyed by suppressive
indirect fire?
What was the mean time B A- 4
2
to suppress targets?
How many targets were B C A- 42
suppressed?
3. EEA: Mobility/Counter-mobility
a. MOE: Time for OPFOR to break
obstcles
MOP: none
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR losses
during breach
MOP : none
c. MOE: Time to breach obsta-
cles (for US)
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of Blue losses
during breach
MOP: How long was required B A-4 7
to breach each obstacle?






MOE: Rate of OPFOR movement
MOP: Was OPFOR slowed? B C A-49
How often was OPFOR B A-49
canalized?
g. MOE: Number/percent of
engineer assets lost







How many casualties were B C P A-51
assessed during an
obstacle breach?
h. MOE: Number planned vs
emplaced/completed
engineer task
MOP: How long does the B A-52
obstacle stop the OPFOR?
i. MOE: Percent of engineer/
equipment hours utilized
per number of availa-
bility
MOP : none
j. MOE: Percentage of hit vs
engagement as a function
of: weapon, exposure,
degree of exposure
MOP: How many casualties B C P A-56
were taken?
How long was the unit C P A-56
engaged until hit?
How long was the target C P A-56
engaged until hit?
4 . EEA: Air Defense
a. MOE: Number of hostile air-
craft that attacked
Blue forces
MOP: How many air attacks B A- 5
7
were not detected?
What percent of the B A-57
vehicles were engaged
by OPFOR aircraft?
How many friendly tar- B A-57
gets are destroyed?







b. MOE: Number of casualties
due to enemy air
MOP: How many times was B A-59
radar moved during a
mission?
What was the casualty B A-59
rate per air attack?
How many casualties B A-60
per air attack?
How many of the vehicles B A-60
were engaged by enemy
aircraft?
How many friendly air- B A-60
craft were damaged/
destroyed?
How many US aircraft B A-60
were engaged by attached
Vulcan?
Were transmitters DFed B A-60
by OPFOR?
How much time was re- B A-60
quired to detect OPFOR?
c. MOE: Percent killed by weapons
system
MOP: How many Redeye were B A- 61
expended?
How many OPFOR aircraft B A-61
were damaged/destroyed?
How much of the basic B A-61
load was expended?
How many major items B A-61







How many Vulcans fired B A- 61
at each aircraft?
How many weapons/weapon B A- 61
systems were available?
How much Vulcan ammuni- B A- 61
tion was expended?
How many rounds hit B A-61
the target (by weapon)
?
How many targets are B A-61
hit by type of weapon?
How many targets are B A-61
killed by type of
weapon?
How many rounds to B A-61
destroy targets by
type of weapon?
How many rounds to hit B A-61
targets by type of
weapon?
d. MOE: Percentage of hostiles
engaged that were killed
MOP: How many air targets B A-62
were engaged?
How many OPFOR aircraft B A-62
were damaged/destroyed?
How many OPFOR aircraft B A-62
were engaged by attached
Vulcan?
How many hits occurred B A-62
per target?
What number of targets B A-62
hits were achieved by
each weapon, by type?







e. MOE: Percentage of engage-
ables that were engaged
per weapons system
MOP: Were friendly aircraft B A-63
engaged by Redeye?
What percent of OPFOR B A-63
aircraft were engaged
by Vulcan?
How many Redeyes were B A-63
expended?
Did the weapons func- B A-63
tion?
What percent engagement B A-63
within the effective
range of weapons systems?
Were OPFOR aircraft B A-64
attacked by Redeye?
How many Vulcans fired B A-64
at each aircraft?
How many Redeyes were B A-64
fired?
How many targets engaged B C A-64
(or killed) by more than
one weapon system?
How many weaons func- B C P A-64
tioned?
f. MOE: Percentage of attackers
who were engageable
MOP: How many fires were B C A- 6
5
outside of section?
5 . EEA: Combat Service Support









b. MOE: Number of other major




MOP: What percent of B C A-67
friendly vehicles
were damaged?
What was the loss rate B C P A-67
equipment?
c. MOE: Time to repair returned
systems
MOP : none
d. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems out of action/
number of major systems
returned to action
MOP: Were vehicles inopera- B C A- 69
tive? (mobility)
What percent of units B A-69
vehicles were recovered?
How much (by type) of B A-69
equipment was affected?
e. MOE: Number of other major
systems out of action/
number of other systems
returned to action
MOP : none




g. MOE: Number of organization-
ally repairable equipment
Subset: out of action
for maintenance/number of







MOP: How many vehicles B A- 72
malfunction?
How many radios mal- B A- 72
function by type?
h. MOE: Maintenance support
request/answered




What was the rate of B A-73
equipment evacuation?
i. MOE: Number of major weapons
systems over time out
of action due to lack
of supply of:
MOP: Did TF stay within fire B C P A- 74
support expenditure
restriction?
j. MOE: Effectiveness of CSS in




a. MOE: Number of casualties
from NBC vs number exposed
MOP: How long did it take B A- 80
to get mission essen-
tial equipment func-
















MOP: How long did it take B A- 81
to decontaminate
Personnel?
How long did it take B A- 81
to decontaminate
equipment?
7. EEA; Command and Control
,
Communications
a. MOE: Number of messages
attempted vs number of
transmissions
acknowledged
MOP: How long did illumina- B C P A-84
tion requests take to
be fired?
b. MOE: Lapsed time of trans-
mission (decision time
from receipt of info
until passed on)
MOP: What was the TF reac- B C A- 8
8
tion time to maneuver
and counter OPFOR
obstacle upon initial
contact by lead elements?
How much time elapsed B C P A-8 8
between warning order
and movement?
c. MOE: Time from information
in to action out















MOP: What was the mean B C P A-lll
transmission time?
How many transmitters B A-lll
were DFed by OPFOR?
What percent of the time B A-113
were scouts used to
screen flanks?
How long did it take B A-119
messenger to get from
point to point?
How many times was B A-122
radar moved during a
mission?
e. MOE: Total top to action and/
or bottom to action time
MOP: At what range did B C P A-12 8
disengagement occur?
f. MOE: Time from immediate
request to execution
MOP: How long did a request B C P A-124
for immediate suppression




a. MOE: EEFI compromised













When did MIJI begin? B C A-146
Did MIJI divert/disrupt B A-146
the friendly force?
How much (by type) of B A-14 7
equipment was effected?




When did MIJI begin? B A-14 7
How many times was GSR B A-14 8
detected by OPFOR DF
equipment?
What was the number B C P A-14 8
of true detections?
How many identifica- B C P A-149
tions were accurate?
How many nonmoving B C P A- 151
vehicles were detected
by the OPFOR?
b. MOE: Number of OPFOR detec-
table/number of OPFOR
detected (by time and
location) . (Detected
includes reported.)
MOP: What is the average B C P A-158





c. MOE: Number of total OPFOR
accurately described in
terms of location, com-
position, and intention/
number of total OPFOR
MOP: How many STANO devices
were actually used at
night?
How many detections
were valid of hostile
aircraft?





How many targets were
detected by GSR?






















1. Ballistic Research Laboratories Memorandum Report No.
667, Requirements for a Theory of Combat , by H.K.
Weiss, pp. 6-11, April 1953.
2. Department of the Army, Army Training and Evaluation
Program 71-2, Army Training and Evaluation Program
for Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Force
, pp. 1-1 to 1-4,
4-9, 17 June 1977.
3. Department of the Army, FM 71-1, The Tank and Mechanized
Infantry Company Team
, pp. 1-1 to 1-14 , 30 June 1977.
4. Department of the Army, FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized
Infantry Battalion Task Force
,
ppT 3-1 to 3-23, 30
June 1977.
5. DA, FM 100-5, Operations
, pp. 1-4, 3-8, 3-10, 3-11,
1 July 1976.
6. Department of the Army, FM 30-10 2, Opposing Forces
Europe
, pp. A-10, 18 Nov 77.
7. Department of the Army, TC 71-5, REALTRAIN
, p. 1-6,
49-54, 56-58, January 1975.
8. Glusovitch, Brian C. , Evaluation of Position Location
Systems for Phase One National Training Center , briefing
notes, p. 26-44 , 17 November 1978.
9. MILES
, p. 3-5, 7, 8, Xerox Electro-Optical Systems
Corporation, 1979.
10. Naval Postgraduate School Report NPS 55-79-014, Some
Thoughts on Developing a Theory of Combat , by R.K.
Huber, L.J. Low and J.G. Taylor, pp. 5-7, July 1979.
11. Obert, John, CDEC Proposal for the Development of
PLAFIRE, briefing notes, p. 7-9, 12 Dec 1979.
12. Stevens, Roger T. , Operational Test and Evaluation
,
pp. 48-56, John Wiley and Sons, 1979.
13. U.S. Army Armor School (USAARMS) Special Text ST
17-1-1, Armor Reference Data, Vol. 1, pp. 176-204, 1977.
158

14. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Technical Report TR 4-76,
TETAM Model Verification Study, Volume 1 , by A.R.
Christensen and others, pp. xii-xv, 1-1 to 1-5, February
1976.
15. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Technical REport TR 5-76,
TETAM Model Verification Study, Volume II , by A.R.
Christensen and E.D. Arendt
, pp. vii-x, 7-1 to 7-4,
February 1976.
16. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Technical Report TR 6-76,
TETAM Model Verification Study, Volume III , by A.R.
Christenson and others, pp. ix-xi , 2-1 to 2-7, February
1976.
17. U.S. Armv Combined Arms Center Technical Report TR 9-79,
Training Instrumentation Evaluation , by R.A. Martray
and M.R. Anderson, iii-vii , 1-4 , 2~3~-66, October 1979.
18. U.S. Army Combined Arms Training Developments Activity
Working Paper Combat Evaluation Program
,
prepared by
D. Hansen and G~. Sikich, pp. 1-1 - 1-6, 2-1 - 2-12,
all appendices, 18 Sep 79.
19. U.S. Army Missile Command Technical Report 8557,
Position Location System Evaluation Report
, by T.Y.
Gin and W.E. Waters, 1-5 to 1-6, 2-1 to 2-5, 2 November
1979.
20. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences Research Report 1024, REALTRAIN
Validation for Armor/Ant i-Armor Teams , by T.D. Scott,
L.L. Meliza, G.D. Hardy, J.H. Banks and L.E. Word,
p. 1-30, March 1979.
21. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences Paper, Tactical Training For Ground
Combat Forces , by T.D. Scott, 5-19, 23-26, 19 April 1979.
22. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Training
Study Report Summary
, pp. 7-14, II-4 - II-7, 8 August 1978
23. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Paper, National
Training Center Development Plan
, pp. 1-2 - 1-6, II-2 -
11-13, III-2 - III-ll, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 4-1, 21-1, 3
April 1979.
24. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Paper, National
Training Centers
, pp. 2-4, 12-15, 32-36, 23 May 1977.
25. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
National Training Center System Specification , Revision




26. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
National Training Center Phase I Instrumentation System
Statement of Work
, pp. 4-9, 14 December 1979.
27. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
Core Instrumentation Subsystem Development Specification
,
Revision 1, p. 7-14, 26 November 1979.
28. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
Prime Item Development Specification for Position Loca-
tion/Event Registration System of the U.S. Army National
Training Center Field Instrumentation Package , Revision
1, p. 11-31, 26 November 1979.
29. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
U.S. Army National Training Center System Description
Live Fire Subsystem ^ Revision 1, p. 2-5 , 26 November
1979.
30. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Working Paper,
National Training Center Preliminary One-Alpha Software
Design Document
,
produced by Science Applications,
Inc., p. 3-13 to 3-19, 30 July 1979.
31. U.S. Army TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity Test Report
FT 398, National Training Center Phase I Concept
Evaluation for Instrumented Live Fire
^ pp. 1-3 - 1-12,
2-4, 2-9 - 2-10.
32. Xerox Corporation Internal Memo, New Vehicle Kill





Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Professor Samuel H. Parry, Code 55Py 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Miller, USA 1
Code 55Mu
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California' 93940




U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: Major G.K. Crocker
Building 37
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651
Headquarters 1
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Deputy Chief of Staff for Training
ATTN: ATTING-PA-NTC (Major Fitzgerald)
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651
Headquarters 1
U.S. Army Combined Arms Training
Developments Activity
Training Methodology Section
ATTN: ATZL-TDA-NTC (LTC Northrup)




Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330
161

10. Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center








































3 2768 002 02320 9
^DLEy KNOXSrV
